

international legitimacy, or at least the legitimacy of their actions on the world stage and to some degree (when it comes to human rights violations) within their own borders, states must agree to play by the rules and accept the judgments of international authorities even when it goes against their interests, provided the interests are not “basic” in the sense Buchanan meant in describing the “modest objectivist view” of rights—that is, interests “constitutive of a decent human life” (such as physical security, protection against religious persecution, and the like).

The last section of the book tackles the vexing issues of humanitarian military intervention and preventive war. Here Buchanan makes cogent arguments against national interest-based foreign policy realism without veering into a dubious liberal internationalist or transnationalist position. Perhaps most interesting, in light of recent U.S. actions connected with its “war on terror,” he says that neither preventive war nor even forced democratization can be ruled out absolutely and that breaking international law may occasionally be justified in order to improve it. But he lays down criteria for judging such actions and, most critically, makes recommendations for regulating the actions or mitigating the risks involved through international institutional mechanisms, recommendations that if adopted (he thinks) would make such maneuvers safer, more effective, and ultimately less necessary. (The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, incidentally, did not meet Buchanan’s minimum requirements for the legitimate use of force.)

In all, Buchanan’s book is an excellent aid to thinking through the problem of human rights and how the civilized world might better respect them.—Scott Segrest, *U.S. Military Academy at West Point*.

FISH, William. *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series. New York-London: Routledge, 2010. xii + 177pp. Cloth, \$105.00; Paper, \$36.95—William Fish’s book stands out among recent introductions to the philosophy of perception for several reasons: first, the number of positions surveyed is the most comprehensive available; second, Fish’s analysis brings epistemology and philosophy of mind together as the two main directories for evaluating philosophical theories of perception; and, finally, in addition to formulating evaluative criteria, Fish develops a taxonomy of the myriad of philosophical accounts of perception based on the following three key principles: the common factor principle, the representational principle, and the phenomenal principle. Accordingly, one of the main goals of the book is to “see how theories of perception can be characterized by means of which of these principles are accepted and which are rejected.”

After setting out his methodological agenda, Fish begins his survey with traditional sense datum theories (chapter 2), which endorse both

the common factor principle and the phenomenal principle. Sense datum theories usually reject the representational principle, although some accounts endorse it in order to respond to epistemological objections. Adverbial theories (chapter 3) endorse the common factor principle and reject both the representational principle and the phenomenal principle. In general, a serious inadequacy of adverbialism seems to be that it has to accept the phenomenology of experience as a primitive fact. Beliefs acquisition theories (chapter 4) traditionally endorse the common factor principle and reject the phenomenal principle, focusing on the epistemological dimension of perception. It is controversial whether or not they endorse the representational principle, but even when they do (see, for instance, D. Armstrong's proposal) they end up reducing the intentionality of perception to the intentionality of belief. Fish contends that belief acquisition theories not only share with adverbialism a lack of attention to phenomenological issues, but that they "would [probably] deny that an episode of acquiring belief *has* a phenomenal character." Although belief acquisition theories have been widely criticized, they provide the rationale for intentional theories, which are the focus of a dense chapter 5. Representationalism, the most popular intentional theory, rejects the phenomenal principle and endorses both the common factor principle and the representational principle.

Unlike the theories considered so far, which all endorse the common factor principle, disjunctivism (chapter 6) denies that veridical and non-veridical visual experiences have "an underlying mental state or event" in common, and contends that illusion, hallucination, and perception belong to different fundamental kinds, even if they are subjectively indiscriminable. Disjunctivism is usually associated with naïve realism, which carries with it rejection of the representational principle and endorsement of the phenomenal principle. Despite the fact that disjunctivists traditionally defend naïve realism to better account for the phenomenology of perception, they have to face numerous phenomenological objections.

The focus of chapters 7 through 9 is with more general features related to philosophical analyses of perception: the place and role of causal components (chapter 7), the relation between philosophical and scientific accounts of perception (chapter 8), and the relevance of non-visual sensory modalities (chapter 9). Discussion of this latter issue opens up new directions for future research in the philosophy of perception. In particular, even if there were a theory of vision which received consensus from the majority of the research community, there are reasons to doubt that the same model could be extended to other sense modalities. Furthermore, it seems an unwarranted assumption that the best way to approach perception is by studying the different sense modalities in isolation from each other.

One of the central themes of the book concerns the interplay between philosophical and scientific accounts of perception. In chapter 8, Fish

discusses some elements of convergence between the two enterprises, pointing in particular at the fact that both scientific and philosophical research on perception are motivated by the same fundamental questions (e.g., how our perceptual capacity relates to our own body and to the external environment). At the same time, however, Fish carefully stresses that attention to the phenomenological and epistemological aspects of perception is what distinguishes philosophical accounts from scientific accounts, which often overlook these dimensions of perception.

Overall, despite the book's many merits, the reader might notice a certain lack of uniformity in Fish's analyses (due, at least in part, to the intricacies of the material discussed). Thus, whereas some chapters (e.g., on sense datum, adverbial, and disjunctivist theories) are more clearly structured in terms of statement of the central claims, presentation of the relevant objections and available responses, and overall evaluation, others (e.g., the chapters on intentional and causal theories) are harder to follow, and may leave the reader somewhat confused as to their main contentions.—Simone Marini, *University College Dublin*.

FRANKS, Christopher. *He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's Economic Teachings*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009. vi + 215pp. Paper, \$27.00—In most economic introductory courses, students early on are asked to distinguish between positive and normative economics: between statements that involve value judgments regarding matters of perceived justice and statements that give empirically measured values. The anthropology envisioned is driven by an insatiable desire to consume goods and services upon which one's welfare depends. In a world conceived without ends, only the welfare claims of affected third parties and questions of efficiency in pricing stand in the way of an unassailable commitment to market determined prices, or exchange value. The *proprietary self*, using Franks's terminology, stands largely unquestioned, and it has colored many of the attempts of interpreting the economic teachings of Aquinas by twentieth century sources.

He Became Poor gives a Thomistic account of economics ordered by charity. In this effort, Franks makes use of the breadth of the Thomistic corpus, including sources often overlooked in Aquinas' treatment of wealth and the virtue of justice: *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem* and the *Contra Doctrinam Retrahentium a Religione*, i.e. Aquinas' defense of religious life and mendicancy. This vision of wealth is obviously at odds with the proprietary self so readily assumed in much of economic thought. In place of the unrestrained drive for self-security and consumption, Franks offers a human approach to wealth that