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**PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, INDIGENEITY,
AND THE GOALS OF MĀORI DEVELOPMENT**

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Indigenous Peoples and States

Public sector reform in New Zealand has had uneven impacts on groups within society. Rural communities for example felt even more isolated when local post offices were closed during the restructuring of the 1980s, and raised further objections when local health facilities such as maternity hospitals were closed because of low volumes and sometimes insufficient staff.¹ While economies of scale and majority opinion are important and to a large extent determine economic and political viability, the traditions, conventions and aspirations of all groups and sub-populations are part of the national identity and must be heeded if reforms are to be consistent with the ideals of a fair and just society. In this sense public sector reformation cannot be measured entirely according to single line economic performance but must recognise national diversity, pluralistic politics and the expectation, if not right, of people to enjoy their own traditions in a way that makes sense to them.²

A strong public sector especially when married to political ideologies that are based on uni-dimensional concepts of progress and development, also poses problems for groups who by virtue of earlier occupation and a distinctive culture assert a right to a level of autonomy that is beyond the state's comfort zone. Indigenous peoples do not always see their destinies locked into the wisdom of the state especially if their sovereignty has been appropriated by colonising powers and their experiences of state control have been marred by dispossession and deculturation.

Despite growing world-wide recognition of indigenous peoples as distinctive populations within nations, states are often ambivalent about creating options that could appear to favour them over other populations within a nation. Where indigenous peoples are a minority, political clout lies with the majority and assertions of rights based on being indigenous is sometimes seen as contrary to the democratic principle of equality. The principle of equality, however, ought to be distinguished from the creation of homogeneity or sameness. Assimilation was a common goal of colonising powers, indigenous peoples often being swept into the cultural, economic and social mores of the new comers. But assimilation is not a principle of democracy any more

than suppression of religion is a measure of a fair and decent society. In this respect, modern democracies cannot be driven solely by the notion of individual freedoms and majority rule. Embedded in the notion of state, at least in democratic countries, are the principles of justice and fairness to individuals and groups.

To that end there have been some calls by indigenous peoples for cession and the creation of independent states where indigenous values can prevail and indigenous resources can be controlled by indigenous peoples. Restoration of pre-colonial sovereignty has sometimes been the aim.³ More often, however, the focus has been on an alteration of arrangements within the state so that outright cession is avoided in favour of greater power sharing. The trend is towards domesticating indigenous self governance. Several models have been proposed including a 'nation within a nation,' tribal and community self governance,⁴ or even the assumption of commonwealth status in relationship to the state.⁵ States have tended to respond to indigenous demands for greater autonomy with a mixture of caution and some irritation. Generally there has been more concern about perceived undermining of the doctrine of a unitary state than about serious efforts to redistribute arrangements for power sharing. In that process indigeneity has been seen as a threat to sovereignty (rather than an attempt to define the basis for belonging), and nationhood has often been confused with statehood.⁶

In the international arena, and because supranational and globalising forces have imposed increasing limitations to the absolute international sovereignty of states, the exercise of self determination or autonomy by indigenous peoples beyond the state, has received little encouragement. Instead self determination is being redefined as autonomy within the state.⁷ This has meant that many governance arrangements for indigenous peoples have been accommodated within federal and pluri-national state systems. In 1998 for example the Nisga'a people of British Columbia reached agreement with the provincial and federal governments of Canada for the right, as a nation, to 'self government, and the authority to make laws.'⁸ In that case, and in the case of Greenland, and Nunavut, the establishment of limited territorial jurisdiction within a wider nation state was possible. However, though momentous, the remoteness of those territories from large white populations was a probable facilitating factor to the states' agreement with the new levels of independence.

Territorially based approaches to self determination are not only unlikely where close proximity to highly populated areas exists, but are even more improbable

where landlessness and displacement have become the rule and territorial integrity has been replaced by urbanisation and the depletion of natural resources. This does not mean that self-governance cannot be entertained but the basis for it may depend more on being indigenous rather than possessing strong claims to major comprehensive property rights over a defined territory. In many democracies, indigeneity by itself may be regarded an insufficient reason for contemplating self-governance, no matter how limited, because it conflicts with the sanctity of equality between all citizens.

But although not all states recognise indigenous peoples as having legitimate claims to a special relationship with the state or with the territory itself, by 1993 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, sponsored by the United Nations, had compiled a set of indigenous rights, codified in the Draft Declaration of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration is primarily about the rights of indigenous peoples, the world over, to retain their culture and resources along with a level of authority that itself stems from earlier occupation and ongoing affinities with the land and the waterways.

Article 3 of the Draft Declaration of Indigenous Peoples for example declares that, 'Indigenous peoples have the right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.'

In so far as States are able to accommodate indigenous rights and aspirations, then the argument about a single nation state is less problematic. But if in balancing the democratic rights of all citizens on the one hand, and the particular position of indigenous peoples on the other, a total emphasis is placed on individual liberties as if that were the sum total of the democratic experience, then accommodation will indeed present difficulties.

The point is that a single nation state is capable of satisfying the parameters of indigenous development provided that value and recognition are afforded to indigeneity as a distinct reality and a relationship based on mutual respect and explicit understandings is forged between the state and the aboriginal people. Although there is a lack of agreement about how the state-indigenous relationship might evolve, at least the challenges have been identified, including the need for frameworks for multiple jurisdictions, and greater clarity about the ways in which parallel and interfacing governance structures might accommodate differentiated citizenship rights to self-government and representation.

Māori and the State

During the long constitutional journey of New Zealand from a British dependency in 1840, a crown colony in 1841, a self governing colony in 1852, a Dominion in 1903, and since 1986 a constitutionally independent nation, the relationship of Māori to the State has been a matter of celebration, dispute and political inconsistency. While in many respects the debate is no different from that involving indigenous peoples and states in other countries, the New Zealand situation has had the benefit (a dubious benefit according to some) of an 1840 treaty, the Treaty of Waitangi, which sets out in broad terms, the conditions of cession. Under the Treaty the British Crown assumed sovereignty in exchange for guarantees that existing property rights would not be unfairly extinguished and Māori individuals would not be disadvantaged alongside the new settlers. It was a brief document and failed to provide detailed guidance on how best the lofty ideals might be implemented, but nonetheless it became the instrument that enabled New Zealand to emerge as a modern and ultimately independent state.

Since 1840, however, the principles inherent in the Treaty have not been recognised in any constant way. Indeed until 1975 when the Waitangi Tribunal was established to inquire into claims against the Crown breaches of the Treaty, legislation and public policy paid little attention to the Treaty. Instead if there were special responsibilities to Māori they were largely seen as part of the state's obligations to disadvantaged people. By 1935, when the foundations for a welfare state were laid, being Māori appeared to have become synonymous with being poor and more often than not, especially after the Great Depression, the association between poverty and Māori was an accurate reflection of the actual situation. But the correlation tended to mask the dimension of indigeneity and Māori aspirations therein for a measure of autonomy, the retention of culture, customary properties, and tribal methods of organisation and governance.

Devolution, Deregulation and Māori Aspirations

When major restructuring of the state and the economy commenced in 1984, government attitudes to the Treaty had been greatly influenced by the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal, the emergence of an articulate, young and dedicated Māori leadership, and the international indigenous rights movement that was increasingly pressuring states to form new types of relationships with indigenes. A government

shift towards decentralisation with less state intervention and greater opportunity for private enterprise was therefore paired, awkwardly at times, with a determination to take the Treaty seriously. Two new directions had emerged: a shift towards free market policies on the one hand and the recognition of Māori as an indigenous population whose relationship with the state had been ordained in the Treaty of Waitangi, on the other.

While there were ideological and political tensions between the parallel directions, creating a measure of confusion as to whether the politicians of the day were ‘techno-liberals’ or ‘market-libertarians’,⁹ there were a number of elements of the reformation process that supported both national economic objectives as well as Māori aspirations. As it happened the major goals of the reforms - reduced state dependency, devolution, and deregulation - were also necessary preconditions for greater Māori independence, tribal re-development, and service delivery to Māori by Māori.

Limited autonomy, such as the management of marae, had been available within the law for many years, but after the 1984 Labour Government assumed office there was fresh impetus for Māori management and control, though within an overall government framework. Deregulation, the introduction of market driven policies, and a downsizing of the state were accompanied by a parallel devolution of many functions to tribal and community organisations. Matua Whangai (foster child care), Mana Enterprises (business initiatives), and Maccess (training for employment) for example were government programmes managed and delivered by Māori using Māori values and Māori expertise. They were consistent with *Te Urupare Rangapiū*, a Government policy sponsored by Hon. Koro Wetere that was designed to guide Māori towards greater self-sufficiency and reduced dependency on the state.¹⁰

Devolution coincided with Māori ambitions for greater autonomy and the re-establishment of social structures such as iwi (tribes). It appeared to offer a degree of self-governance although clearly it was a government agenda with limited Māori control and confusing grounds for its justification. Sometimes devolution was promoted as a partnership between Māori and the state, sometimes as community empowerment, sometimes as debureaucratisation and sometimes, especially in Māori eyes, as government abandonment of responsibility for Māori affairs.¹¹ Māori saw the process from two quite different perspectives. In a positive sense, devolution presented opportunities for assuming new levels of responsibility, but there were also

some disquieting signals that it was a government manoeuvre for economic reform and cost cutting at Māori expense.¹²

In the event, within a decade Māori had become major players in service delivery and had effectively entered the health, education, social welfare and labour sectors as providers of a range of services that had previously been the province of the state or of professional enclaves. Often services became part of tribal systems (such as Ora Toa, a health service managed by the Ngāti Toa tribal authority) but many non-tribal organisations, based on provider groups or communities of interest also assumed the roles of providers. Some providers, such as Te Roopu Taurima o Manukau and Puangi Hau were established as stand alone organisations with their own directors and systems of management.¹³

It was not only the delivery of social services that enthused Māori. By acknowledging that the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed Māori property rights, the Government was also persuaded to see language and culture as a type of property that also deserved protection. In 1986 the Waitangi Tribunal had delivered a report recommending greater government resolve to protect a language that was headed for extinction.¹⁴ As a result the Māori Language Commission was established and Māori was declared to be an official language of New Zealand.

Across the country and in quick succession some 400 Māori speaking early childhood centres opened (kohanga reo) followed by Māori language primary and secondary school and later three state funded wānanga (Māori tertiary educational institutions). Integral to the new direction was the recognition that Māori culture had no other homeland than New Zealand and that there was an obligation on the State to contribute to its retention and development.

Māori Capacity

Not all Māori programmes have been successful and some failures have attracted wide media attention. For the most part, however, Māori providers have shown a capacity to engage Māori people and to provide services beyond the reach of conventional professional service providers in a way that makes sense to Māori. But the rapid growth of Māori services over the past decade has also highlighted some shortcomings. A well trained and competent workforce and efficient management systems have been identified as two areas where additional capacity is needed. In addition arrangements for effective governance have been given increasingly greater

attention. Customary methods of control and policy-making have not been found to be ideal for the governance of enterprises that have legal, commercial and contractual implications and accountability requirements demanding high levels of compliance.

A need for new organisations capable of providing appropriate governance structures that can cope with both commercial and cultural imperatives has been demonstrated. Under the Māori Trust Boards Act and the Incorporated Societies Act a number of Māori bodies had long since established legal entities but more clearly defined methods of representation and accountability to iwi members were required as devolution occurred. The concurrent advancement of Treaty of Waitangi settlements raised similar concerns. Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996 provides for a governing body which, unlike the earlier Ngai Tahu Māori Trust Board, does not require permission from the Minister of Māori Affairs for commercial undertakings. Instead accountability is back to the tribe. Te Kauhanganui, the governing body for the Waikato hapū has similarly taken over from the Tainui Māori Trust Board as a more representative tribal council.

Less experienced community groups that have arisen from the efforts of a few dedicated community workers have not always appreciated the distinctions between management and governance and in that respect have sometimes blurred lines of accountability. Their situation has highlighted the relatively small pool of suitably qualified people who can fulfil both strategic and compliance governance roles and has made the need for governance training an obvious priority, alongside workforce development and management training.

Treaty Relationships and Contractual Relationships

Devolution of state functions to Māori has brought some dilemmas for the state. A Treaty relationship between Māori and the state has usually been premised on principles of partnership, mutual benefits and mutual respect. But programme delivery has required that more specific relationships be developed around itemised contracts for service. Agreeing on a contract has not always been straightforward. First there has often been debate about the organisations best suited to receive government funding and whether tribal authorities should be given priority over non-tribal organisations such as urban Māori authorities. Second, the process for mandating has been confused and subject to capture by groups close to the political action. With whom should the government deal? Third, despite the importance of economies of

scale, fragmentation of effort in Māori communities has been a common occurrence as factions have vied with each other for government contracts.

But while those problems have often been labelled as problems of Māori capacity, they are as much signs of an over-riding political philosophy of competition and market devotion. In that climate fragmentation was a predictable result, made worse by a legislative vacuum that simply failed to address the complexities of modern Māori society. Nor was it always clear whether the basis for contracting was related to political goals associated with the Treaty of Waitangi and the historic relationships between tribes and the state, or goals of equity where fairness as between groups in society was the major consideration.

For their part, Māori organisations also had difficulties balancing the state's system of contracting with Māori developmental aspirations. Because Māori organisations often had agreements to deliver programmes in health, education, social services, and employment they had to deal with several government departments each with its own method of contracting. Transaction costs were high, especially for smaller groups who were required to meet with a range of government agencies that had little or no communication with each other. Health contracts for example were structured quite independently from social service contracts; there were varied reporting requirements and different formulae for establishing appropriate levels of funding. Whole of government contracts may prove to be more consistent with Māori aspirations but in the meantime the sectoral nature of the state runs counter to Māori preferences for a holistic approach.

Performance measures contained in contracts have also often been difficult to reconcile with Māori perspectives and expectations. Frequently indicators have failed to reflect Māori world-views and have seldom been able to endorse Māori aspirations for an integrated approach to social, cultural and economic development. A health outcome measure that can integrate spiritual, physical, mental and social dimensions has been devised and initial trials suggest that it has potential as a measure of service effectiveness.¹⁵ Although a number of programmes delivered by Māori do not differ markedly from similar programmes run by other providers, part of the rationale for Māori services is the inclusion of Māori concepts, cultural paradigms and distinctive methods of communication. Unless contract performance measures recognise those elements, the full potential of Māori services to make a difference will be unrealised.

Public sector reform has brought the relationship between Māori and the state under closer scrutiny and it has become clear that a distinction needs to be made between a treaty relationship and a service relationship. The treaty relationship, between the state and a tribe or another organisation that represents Māori, is less concerned with service delivery than with strategic planning, resource allocation, priority setting, and processes for decision-making. Essentially it is part of a governance function and is most aptly expressed when Māori and the Crown are able to jointly consider future directions for Māori if not for the nation.

There have been relatively few occasions when Māori and the Crown have been able to engage in exercises related to future development. More often the relationship has been activated to deal with problems from the past such as the settlement of grievances. The forward-looking relationship, highlighted during the Hui Taumata Mātauranga when Ministers of Education met with Māori to discuss educational policies, differs from the settlement relationship in its aims, goals, time focus, starting points, end points, and the nature of the relationship itself.¹⁶ Unlike the settlement process, the forward-looking relationship does not end when the grievance is remedied. A settlement relationship has served its purpose once a settlement has been negotiated; the ‘full and final’ clause makes it clear that the end point is to be durable. In relationships that are about planning for the future, however, there is no endpoint. The relationship must be an ongoing one if it is to address change, contemporary threats, fresh opportunities and new technologies.

Relationships that are based on the delivery of a service may originate from a treaty relationship and Māori may have played some role in deciding the broad objectives and the over-riding principles. But in choosing to deliver a state programme, the relationship then becomes premised on the terms of the contract rather than the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. A single entity such as a tribal authority may enjoy both types of relationships with the state, a treaty relationship when considering broader issues, and a contractual relationship when delivering a service on behalf of the state.

To the extent that a combination of devolution and deregulation has contributed to a greater level of self-sufficiency, Māori aspirations for self-governance have been advanced. However, the context within which the new levels of autonomy are practised and the inherent contradiction between service delivery on the one hand and autonomy on the other has created tension between Māori providers

and the State. For example while the provision of social services by iwi (tribes) was a primary intention of the Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, there was often lack of clarity about the freedom iwi had to deliver the service in their own way. Although the exercise was promoted as an opportunity for the exercise of ‘tino rangatiratanga’¹⁷, the Department was heavy handed in terms of setting the agenda and prescribing the measures and standards to be used.¹⁸ Further, there was a clear philosophical difference between senior managers from the Department and Māori community leaders.¹⁹

In hearing the claim lodged by Te Whanau o Waipareira against the Community Funding Agency of the Department of Social Welfare, the Waitangi Tribunal has also noted the narrowness of Government policies inherent in the devolution of state functions to Māori and recommended that devolution should include provision for groups to have sufficient authority that they are able to take an integrated and coordinated approach to community development.²⁰ In the Tribunal’s view, devolution should be primarily about empowerment.

In many ways the tensions arising from the devolution of state functions can be traced to a misrepresentation of the parameters. An often-used government translation for devolution was ‘tukua te rangatiratanga’, implying a transfer of full decision-making and power rather than simply delivering a service on behalf of the Crown. ‘Rangatiratanga’ was also used when the 1993 health reforms were being introduced to explain the significance of iwi health care plans. In fact, ‘full control,’ conveyed in the Māori translations, was much more ambitious than the reforms could ever have delivered or even intended to deliver.

Critical to the discussion about devolution is the distinction between the devolution of function and the devolution of authority. While as a result of the devolutionary process many Māori groups are able to exercise a measure of self-governance in the way they deliver a programme, final accountability and indeed the terms of governance are prescribed by the state, not Māori. For many providers that is not necessarily a problem, but in the eyes of a number of Māori it is a barrier to effective development. In any event, unless the distinction is clear, relationships can easily sour.

Mainstreaming the State Sector

The responsibility of the state to actively protect Māori interests has been recognised as a Treaty of Waitangi obligation existing alongside the state's duty to all citizens and is reinforced by the State Sector Act 1988 which requires public sector management to recognise the aims and aspirations of Māori people, the employment requirements of Māori people in the Public Service, and the need for greater involvement of Māori people in the Public Service. However, the dual obligations to Māori and to all citizens, are not always readily reconciled and some concern has been expressed that there is an inherent conflict between the principle of equal rights and the principles arising from the Treaty of Waitangi that allocate different entitlements for Māori.²¹ While this conflict is a source of ongoing debate in New Zealand, and was activated in a contentious speech made by the Leader of the opposition in January 2004,²² a Treaty obligation on the state has been recognised since 1846 when the Supreme Court ruled that the Treaty was binding on the Crown.²³

As already discussed, however, the way in which that obligation is met, is often confusing because of the uncertain justification for recognising Māori interests: at times a Treaty based rationale, at others a recognition of socio-economic disparities, and often a blurred combination of both. Whether on the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi or for reasons of equity, four approaches to recognising Māori interests have been adopted by the State over the past two decades: biculturalism; active Māori recruitment into the state sector, mainstreaming, and delivering effective outcomes.²⁴

Even though the bicultural parameters have not been carefully defined, the New Zealand public service has promoted a model of biculturalism. Biculturalism, has a range of meanings that can be represented across a bicultural continuum; at one extreme a type of cultural exchange, at the other an independent or semi-independent Māori organisation.²⁵ Initially the bicultural objective was simply to introduce Māori values and cultural norms into the public sector so that Māori staff and clients could feel greater affinity with the department's processes. In 1991/92 for example an objective of the State Services Commission was to improve awareness of 'tikanga Māori' (Māori custom and lore) within the Commission.²⁶ Later, because the cultural focus did not seem to address the essential functions of state departments, Māori

groups (largely state employees) argued for making the department's core business more relevant to Māori. In their view biculturalism should have been more about delivering positive results, increasing the Māori public service workforce and establishing units within departments where a critical mass of Māori staff could provide leadership in policies and programmes for Māori.²⁷

Although recruitment into the public service has been a government strategy for twenty or more years, in fact the size of the workforce has not increased in any spectacular way. The real numbers of Maori public servants have actually decreased significantly since 1988, largely because of the overall downsizing of the state but also because Māori agencies such as tribal authorities have provided alternate opportunities. Probably the proportion of Māori public servants has remained relatively stable, around eight percent and close to the level of Māori participation in the wider labour force.²⁸ However, it is still a way off from the level of Māori representation in the working age population. When the distribution of Māori state employees is considered there is a more obvious dearth of Māori at senior management levels. By 1996 only 3.6 percent of public service managers were Māori compared with representation in the public service as a whole of 8.2 percent; and only one chief executive was Māori. At the same time Māori are over represented in the lower salary brackets.²⁹

Prior to 1984 Māori leadership in the public service was firmly wedded to the Department of Māori Affairs and relatively few Māori were employed elsewhere in the public service. Devolution and mainstreaming changed that. Te Puni Kokiri, the current Ministry of Māori Development is a small ministry; many of the former Māori Affairs' functions have either been devolved beyond the state sector or transferred to other Government departments. Although the mainstreaming process appeared to create fragmentation rather than solidarity and there was some scepticism about the capacity of the so-called mainstream to deliver in an effective manner,³⁰ there was nonetheless an expectation that all departments would be responsive to Māori.

Responsiveness of the state to Māori is not easily measured but it might be gauged by three indicators: the degree of involvement of Māori within the sector, performance measures that indicate progress towards strategic goals, objectives and outputs, and changes in actual outcomes for Māori. As well there was a related expectation that Māori would contribute to service design, delivery of services, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, in relationship to the structure of a public

sector organisation it was considered that government agencies have administrative and management arrangements that would enable the monitoring of organisational performance with respect to Māori and sufficient control of quality to ensure outputs are effective for Māori.

State responsiveness to Māori is not only dependent on the level of Māori participation in the public service, but also the capacity of the state to contribute to Māori advancement through other mechanisms. These two variables, workforce participation and the implementation of effective policies and programmes, are linked but they are essentially different concerns and the one does not necessarily follow the other. Increasing the level of direct Māori involvement in the state is important and can be justified on several grounds but unless the effort leads to demonstrable benefits for Māori the exercise becomes one of primarily creating equal employment opportunities rather than specifically advancing Māori people. The equal employment goal is not insignificant but it is a different aim from achieving best outcomes for Māori.

Measuring Outcomes for Māori

Many of the outcomes for Maori development are essentially generic, shared by other groups and individuals; they have a universal application. Well-being and wealth are aspirations common of all people. Generic outcome measures tend to measure Māori outcomes against the outcomes of other populations such as non-Māori and Pacific. Good health for example is a common goal for all people and when Māori health status is measured it is usually within the context of the health status of non-Māori; the focus is on the gap between the two groups rather than the specific way in which Māori might contextualise health.

In an effort to distinguish between generic outcomes and those outcomes that are specific to Maori, and as part of its role to monitor other government departments and their responsiveness to Maori, the Ministry of Maori Development has developed a monitoring framework that includes three sets of indicators and four levels of application. The indicators are universal (i.e. acceptable for cross-national comparisons), Maori specific indicators (i.e. indicators that capture the relevance of being Maori) and Maori organisational indicators (i.e. indicators that will be useful to Maori groups and organisations in assessing progress). The four levels of application are local, regional, national, and international.³¹

An outcomes schema, Te Ngāhuru, has also been developed to assist in the identification of Māori specific outcomes and indicators.³² Based on five principles, two broad domains of outcome are identified: human capacity and resource capacity. Human capacity reflects the way in which Māori are able to participate as Māori in society generally as well as in Māori society, te ao Māori. It is concerned with individuals and groups and measures cultural outcomes such as language proficiency and opportunities for the practice of Māori custom in a variety of settings such as work, home and public institutions. In contrast, the resource capacity outcome domain refers to the state of Māori resources, including cultural and intellectual resources as well as physical resources. A good outcome is one where Māori resources such as land are increasing in economic value and are expanding to meet the greater needs of future generations.

Ultimately the impacts of public sector reforms on Māori must be measured against both sets of criteria. First, as citizens of New Zealand, Māori performance should be assessed according to universal outcomes (such as life expectancy, educational achievement, employment). There should not be wide disparities between groups. This aim is not necessarily a consequence of the Treaty of Waitangi but of the goals of a fair and just society.

Second, as an indigenous people Māori performance should be measured against Māori specific outcome indicators that are derived from Māori culture and traditional physical resources such as land. Best outcomes for Māori are the product of universal and Māori specific outcomes.

In one sense provisions for Maori in policy and in legislation suggest there is something special about the position of Māori in New Zealand though what is special is not always made clear. Is the Māori dimension about disadvantage, or about righting past wrongs, or about the celebration of culture, or indigenous property rights or a Treaty of Waitangi relationship?

In effect it is about all of these things and they are intertwined to the extent that too fine a dissection creates an artefact. For example in understanding socio-economic disadvantage, a secure cultural identity might be a key determinant for achievement and success just as alienation of traditional resources such as land might be a critical contributing factor to the disadvantage of later generations. From that perspective it

becomes somewhat academic to conclude, as some economists might, that need is colour blind.

While Māori themselves will have major roles to play in achieving the best results for both sets of outcomes, there is also a critical role for the state. In many respects the reforms had quite contradictory results for Māori. Māori individuals bore much of the pain of restructuring. It was not until 2003 that there were significant reduction of unemployment rates to around ten percent, and even then there remained significant disparities between Maori and other New Zealanders (five percent).

But the reforms also created an environment where Māori enterprise and entrepreneurship could flourish and where a degree of autonomy could be entertained. Moreover, as part of that independence, language revitalisation, tribal reorganisation and Maori service delivery escalated in a manner and to an extent that would have been difficult to predict in 1984.

In other words, while universal outcomes continued to lag, there had been substantial gains in Maori specific outcome areas.

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⁴ J. Frideres, *Native Peoples in Canada Contemporary Conflicts*, Fourth Edition (Canada: Prentice Hall 1993), pp. 449-462.

⁵ R. Robbins, Self Determination and Subordination, in M. A. Jaimes (ed.) *The State of Native America Genocide, Colonization and Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), pp. 110-112.

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⁸ Canada, British Columbia, Nisga'a Nation, *Nisga'a Final Agreement* (Canada: Federal Treaty Negotiations Office, 1998), pp. 159-183.

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- ⁹ Colin James, (1992), *New Territory: the transformation of New Zealand 1894-92*, Bridget Williams, Wellington, pp. 234-275.
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- ¹² M. Durie, (1998), *Te Mana Te Kāwanatanga The Politics of Māori Self Determination* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 10-13.
- ¹³ There are many examples. Te Roopu Taurima o Manukau provides residential care for intellectually disabled and Puangi Hau offers a range of alcohol and drug programmes.
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- ¹⁵ Te Kani Kingi, (2002), *Hua Oranga Best Health Outcomes for Māori*, Ph D Thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North.
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- ¹⁷ Self determination, independence.
- ¹⁸ J. Bradley, The Resolve to Devolve: Māori and Social Services, *Social Work Now*, 1995, 1, pp. 29-35.
- ¹⁹ D. Sorrenson, Kaupapa Māori and its Influence on Organisational Change, *Social Work Now*, 1997, 6, pp. 21-24.
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