Contents
Section 1
Palaeoanthropology
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Photogallery Outline of Human Phylogeny Evolutionary Trees and DNA Brain Evolution Hand and Bipedality |
Section 2
Social and socio-
cultural systems
Section 3
Ontogeny and symbolism
Section 4
Language systems
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Links Policy Relevant Links |
Animal language and cognition projects
Carolyn Ristau
Abstract
Interpreting the data on the cognitive and linguistic abilities of non-human species needs to be done with care. The results of particular studies need to be understood in the light of (1) the ontogeny of the ability in question and the specific training procedures involved in demonstrating it; (2) the settings within which abilities are observed þ laboratory versus field; (3) a precise description of and the limits of the abilities claimed to have been demonstrated; (4) the number of individual animals that are claimed to show the abilities in question; and (5) possible problems in experimental designs. Given all these constraints, summary statements must be somewhat provisional.
Some of the Great Apes, in some situations, have achieved the
use of rudimentary symbols. This ability can be used to
support symbolic forms of communication, especially requests,
between apes and their human 'carers'. This symbolic
communication ability does not show the multiplicity of
functions that humans employ. Particularly in the past, the
training methods used to establish these abilities did not
bear much resemblance to the procedures by which human
children develop language skills; more recent methods do
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al 1993; Boysen 1993b). There is little
evidence that most apes use grammar in their communications,
though one bonobo has attained at least a rudimentary grammar.
Furthermore, in some highly specific situations, apes,
sea-lions (Zalophus californianus), and dolphins
(Tursiops truncatus) are able to comprehend the order
of lexcical items, and some apes and pigeons can reproduce
certain simple series reliably.
The relation between comprehension and the production of
symbols in non-human species is unclear, though the two
systems appear more independent of each other than in humans.
With specific training to do so, highly 'language'-trained
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can transfer symbols
learned in one mode to the other, and then generalize this
ability to new symbols. The bonobo (Pan paniscus)
seems able to make such transfers far more readily. Some
enhanced quantitative and reasoning abilities can be
demonstrated for 'language'-trained apes as compared to apes
not so trained. In some cases these findings depend on the
performance of one particularly apt ape; and it is not yet
clear that it is only 'language' training that is responsible
for the differences found: this research should be extended.
The demonstration of symbol use and category formation in
non-primate species implies that it is not the unique
organization of the primate brain, nor any special property of
their social and physical environments alone, that is
responsible for the possession of some symbolic ability.
Furthermore, since the apes are our contemporaries and not our
ancestors, the question remains open as to the evolutionary
significance of those abilities for human abilities. It is
clear, however, that humans have a far greater facility for
acquiring and using symbolic systems than any other
species.
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