Feminism of all types can be seen to share some common ground and it is from Weedon (1987) I take my definition of feminism:
Feminism is a politics. It is a politics directed at changing existing power
relations between men and women in society. These power relations structure
all areas of life, the family, education and welfare, the worlds of work and
politics, culture and leisure. They determine who does what and for whom,
what we are and what we might become (1987, p. 1).
Fraser and Nicholson see the concerns of both postmodernism and feminism as so inter-related that a useful union of both is worth articulating:
Feminists, like postmodernists, have sought to develop new paradigms of social
criticism which do not rely on traditional philosophical underpinnings. They
have criticized modern foundationalist epistemologies and moral and political
theories, exposing the contingent, partial, and historically situated character of
what has passed in the mainstream for necessary, universal, and ahistorical
truths. They have called into question the dominant philosophical project of
seeking objectivity in the guise of a "God's eye view" which trancends any
situation or perspective (1990, p. 26).
Flax (1990) also states:
Postmodern discourses are all deconstructive in that they seek to distance us
from and make us sceptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power,
the self, and language that are taken for granted within, and serve as
legitimation for, contemporary Western culture (p. 41).
It is important to note that there is no one 'feminist' perspective or position; it is more correct to speak of 'feminisms'. Recent feminist theorizing has tended to be more reflexive upon some of its own implicit assumptions. The tendency of 'feminist theory' to adopt a meta-narrative or universalizing approach that is a 'totalizing discourse' has been critiqued by those who propose a 'postmodernist or poststructuralist' feminism (see Flax, 1990; Fraser, 1992; Gavey, 1990; Kristeva, 1981; Lather, 1988; Nicholson, 1990; Weedon, 1987). The aim of these writers is not to denounce the force or potency of previous feminist writing but to offer a more critical theory that is historically contextualized and able to account for cultural diversities and differences between women and advocates a move away from 'disabling vestiges of essentialism' (McNay, 1992, p. 120).
One critique of the tendency toward a 'totalizing discourse' has arisen from women of different class, race, ethnic and sexual orientations regarding 'the universal oppression of women' discourse as only voicing the concerns of white, western, middle class, heterosexual women. It is argued then that questions of racism and classism are not adequately addressed or only paid lip-service within some feminist theorising (see Fraser and Nicholson, 1990). Fraser and Nicholson (1990) say:
In recent years, poor and working-class women, women of colour, and lesbians
have finally won a wider hearing for their objections to feminist theories which
fail to illuminate their lives and address their problems. They have exposed the
earlier quasi-metanarratives, with their assumptions of universal female
dependence and confinement to the domestic sphere, as false extrapolations
from the experience of the white, middle-class, heterosexual women who
dominated the beginnings of the second wave (p. 33).
Thus we need both theories and practices that attend to differences between women, both within and across historical periods and cultures; they believe some of the postmodern theorists enable the development of these new ways of working.
Another tendency within some feminist discourses is to subscribe implicitly to the humanist articulation of the notion of an 'essential' self that is fixed and unchanging, for example, either in the form of a language that speaks of women's experience as some quintessential or transcendental truth (see Gavey, 1990, p. 5) or the biological essentialism implicit in some feminist theories (e.g. Firestone, 1970, cited in Nicholson, 1990, p. 27). Feminist poststructuralism questions the fixing of such an unique, individualized and essential self and sees all experience as having no 'inherent' meaning, but that meaning is given to experience via language. As Gavey (1990) points out it is not that liberal humanist values are unworthy, per se, but that
the absence of metatheoretical concerns about power render them insufficient
(p. 4).
Weedon (1987) also comments on the need for theory that looks at the relationship between experience, social power and resistance, yet still recognizes the importance of the subjective in constituting the meaning of women's lived realities and be able to account for diverging and different 'subject positions' (see pp. 8-9).
Women adopting poststructuralist or postmodernist approaches contend that insufficient attention has been paid to language, in the form of discourse, which constructs both our 'subject positions' and 'subjectivity' and an analysis that starts to enable an articulation of how these are constructed, and/or may be resisted, is needed. While this may also question even some of feminism's implicit assumptions, this could be both necessary and productive. Lather (1988) argues that:
we need to wrestle with the postmodern questioning of the lust for
authoritative accounts if we are not to remain as much part of the problem as
of the solution ourselves (cited in Gavey, 1990, p. 5).
This 'postmodern' shift in thinking can be located, some say, as a more general movement within the contemporary Western cultural tradition which problematizes Enlightenment beliefs and the philosophy of an essential, individualized, rational and coherent self (and society). A postmodern position would entail assumptions such as there is no one 'Truth' but many competing truth claims, and pluralism, relativism and heterogeneity reign. There has been a move away from 'grand theory' to a more localized and contextualized approach in theorizing.
A postmodernist feminism, according to Fraser and Nicholson (1990) would be:
contrasts instead of covering laws [and] would replace unitary notions of
woman and feminine gender identity with plural and complexly constructed
conceptions of social identity (pp. 34-5).comparativist rather than universalist and attuned to changes and
This can be developed, Weedon argues, through attending to,
recent poststructuralist developments in the theory of language, subjectivity
and power for knowledge production which will serve feminist interests
(Weedon, 1987, p. 10).
Gavey (1990) suggests that a way of working that is consistent with a feminist poststructuralist perspective is discourse analysis. Further to this she also contends that discourse analysis provides a way of working that enables the articulation of contradictions between discourses, creating competing discursive positions which avoid recourse to either theories of 'false consciousness' and the researcher making inferences about a person's 'true' beliefs, or to a 'unified theory' which may not be able to contend with the complex and fragmentary 'nature' of social life and interaction. She says:
It is possible, therefore, not to deny desires which may be incompatible with
liberation, 'but to understand desires as produced and therefore, potentially at
least, as changeable' (cited in Gavey, 1990, p. 9-10)
Gavey sees important shared ground between feminism and poststructuralism - for example, that the social and historical specificity required in this approach is not dissimilar to concerns compatible with socialist feminist theories - and therefore that it is futile to dichotomize the two movements.
Fraser (1992) suggests that a theory of discourse can help us understand at least four things, all of which are interrelated. These are:
First, it can help us understand how people's social identities are fashioned and
altered over time. Second, it can help us understand how, under conditions of
inequality, social groups in the sense of collective agents are formed and
unformed. Third, a theory of discourse can illuminate how the cultural
hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested. Fourth, and
finally, it can shed light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and
political practice (cited in Fraser and Bartky, 1992, p. 178).
This, she says, requires a number of theoretical approaches, and she advocates a form of 'bricolage' to overcome any tendency toward a total theory. Fraser (1992) suggests a 'pragmatic approach', based upon the works of Bourdieu, Bakhtin, Foucault, Habermas, Gramsci and aspects of Kristeva in developing her 'postmodern feminism'; whilst Weedon's (1987) poststructural position draws on Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, aspects of Cixous, Irigaray, Kristeva, and Lacan.
There seems to be what could be described as a 'creative tension' between different 'feminist' positions. This tension is perhaps part of the 'inevitable' process of knowledge production. Difficulties arise if one sees this as a dichotomy between modern and postmodern - both positions have useful contributions to make.
Lyotard states the 'hard-line':
The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of
unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a
narrative of emancipation (1984, p. 37, cited in McNay, 1992, p. 125).
Yet postmodernism itself must be wary of creating its own 'regime of truth' and transposing one 'grand narrative' for another. An observation from Nancy Harstock I think echoes the dilemma of adopting an "either/or" approach:
despite its anti-foundational claims, postmodernist theory rests on a desire for
universality; the desire for totality is replaced with an equally totalizing desire
for contextualism, pluralism and heterogeneity (cited in McNay, 1992:130)
Whilst a 'postmodern' position may be one I would have great empathy with I would risk the accusation of writing from the position of a 'true believer' of the fundamentalist creed according to 'postmodernism' if I did not outline some of the 'tensions' between modernism/postmodernism within feminism.
Some of the main tensions have been outlined in McNay (1992, pp. 120-130) and have centred around questions to do with the political impact postmodernism may or may not have on feminism in terms of 'losing' the power to offer a practical and valid form of social criticism if one forsakes large historical narratives and analyses of societal macrostructures. As McNay articulates the concerns via Fraser and Nicholson's (1988) paper 'Social Criticism without a Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism' and reactions to it, I am left wondering whether it is a 'storm in a tea-cup'. Both 'sides' agree that feminist scholarship is still
Insufficiently attentive to the theoretical prerequisites of dealing with diversity,
despite widespread commitment to accepting it politically (Fraser and
Nicholson, 1988, p. 389, cited in McNay, 1992, p. 120)
;
that is, the question of 'difference' has to be addressed more fully by feminist theory. Both concur also that contrary to Lyotard's pronouncement of the necessity that all grand narratives must be discarded, for feminism such a position is not useful. The point of contention then seems to be an effect of contests over the meaning of the term 'postmodern'.
I wonder if Larrain's (1994) distinction between postmodernism and poststructuralism would hold more appeal? Larrain (1994) says:
The dividing line between poststructuralism and postmodernism is far from
clear. They certainly share a good number of premises and principles- for
instance, the centrality of discourse for modern life, the relativist distrust of
truth, the discursive constitution of the subject, and so on...While for
poststructuralism ideology critique is replaced by the articulating discourse
which creates ideologically active subject positions, for postmodernism ideology
critique is replaced by the end of ideology (pp. 90-1).
Yet this is probably an over-simplification of some major issues which I will try to summarize.
The main question is, if all is reduced to "relativism" where does that leave social critique of injustice and oppression? Fraser and Nicholson (1988) argue that feminism can rescue postmodernism from its 'nihilistic' tendencies, and it is a false leap from the anti-foundationalist critique of philosophy in postmodernism to deny any social criticism beyond the local. Understanding the force and power of sexism, racism, and ethnocentrism necessitates charting the 'genealogy' of them; we need to be able to ground our analysis historically and contextually in a critical way, therefore requiring some form of 'grand narrative'. Kellner (1988) suggests Lyotard overgeneralizes the phrase 'grand narrative' and what is needed is some form of differentiation between different types of narrative. He suggests a distinction between 'master narratives' that attempt to subsume every view under one total theory and 'grand narratives' which attempt to
chart the history and development, for example, capital, patriarchy or the
colonial subject (cited in McNay, 1992, p. 125).
Fraser and Nicholson (1988) say that postmodern social theory
must not begin with a reflection on the condition of philosophy, but must start
from an analysis of the nature of the social object which is to be criticized, e.g.
social relations between men and women (cited in McNay, 1992, p. 120-1).
This requires a number of theoretical approaches, and as noted previously they advocate a form of 'bricolage' to overcome any tendency toward a total theory.
Those that question the adoption (or co-option) of 'postmodernism' into feminism (although Flax (1987) contends feminism is postmodern) say:
Feminist politics is, at a fundamental level, posited on [the] modernist
metanarrative of personal emancipation (McNay, 1992, p. 123).
That is, feminism can be located as part of modernism, even though it forswears Enlightenment values. Soper (1989) fears that a postmodern approach, with an over-stress on difference, may deprive us of the possibility of a 'feminist ethic' rooted in certain social norms and moral codes that ground calls for change - for example, in laws that adversely affect women. She worries that an emphasis on the 'particular' may lead to
equivalence of all biases and particularities and reduces the feminist ethic to
just one of many equally valid viewpoints [and] if taken to its ultimate
conclusion must condone an anarchist and wholly de-regulated economic and
social policy, and..we must ask again whether this - with its obvious neo-rightist
overtones - is what feminists are wanting (cited in McNay, 1992, p. 127).
Harding (1990) also raises concerns regarding relativism in that such a position, like its counterpart objectivism, may act to justify silencing women. Gavey's (1990) response to fears of relativism is to emphasize that we not abandon our 'ethics' and values; in fact she sees recent moves within 'social constructionist' theories as reasserting a 'moral' dimension into psychology as a discipline. Yet what is questionable is a way of guaranteeing or fixing these knowledges or convincing others of their 'truth'. According to Kitzinger (1986, cited in Gavey, 1990, p. 16), theory and research should be assessed in terms of their utility in achieving politically defined goals.
It is my impression that at the 'heart' of most 'postmodernist' and 'poststructuralist' writers there lurks an implicit 'leftist' political agenda (see Larrain, 1994, p. 90), yet one is caught by what Wittgenstein terms "language games". My interpretation of one function of postmodernist thinking is that it seeks to dislodge dominant and oppressive 'regimes of truth', yet in articulating a 'deconstruction' of Enlightenment beliefs deconstruction comes from a position of being a 'product' and a part of this cultural heritage. Also in constructing postmodern 'theoretical' criticisms, the 'logic' of the arguments preclude explicitly defining a 'normative' basis to this critique because they would then undermine the theorists own critique. Postmodern theorists would be in danger of constructing yet another 'regime of truth', yet in so doing the way is left open for these theories to be co-opted for ends which may not have envisaged.
Both Larrain (1994) and McNay (1992) look at the implicit assumptions within Foucault's theories and conclude that he does offer an agenda which maintains the notion of a politics of emancipation/liberation, and one that is compatible with, but different from, traditional Enlightenment values. It is perhaps one reason some feminists have spent most time on reconstructing a Foucauldian inspired analysis of power relations.
Two points arise from the above. Firstly, there seems to be no shared understanding of what 'postmodernism' means, and therefore, it is not surprising that communication between theorists seems confusing. Secondly, how and where the term is used varies widely (and perhaps this is part and parcel of its meaning). Within such a framework Stephen White (1991) tries to articulate a 'middle-way' between modernism and postmodernism (which he would rather define as 'post-modern modernity') toward a theory of justice which speaks a language of political and ethical engagement and questions injustice. He advocates an ethic derived from Heidegger on a 'responsibility to otherness' and a re-evaluation of the utility of Habermas's communicative ethics (see pp. 140-3). It is his belief that
one cannot discuss justice and collective action in any sustained fashion without
implying at least some elements of a metanarrative (1991, p. 140).
This certainly echoes Fraser and Nicholson's (1990) view, cited earlier. What is needed, he says, is an understanding of 'normative discourse' from a viewpoint that encompasses how groups articulate and negotiate justifications of certain norms and shared values - thus postmodern approaches provide a basis for this. White pushes the liberal notion of 'tolerating diversity' (which may be debateable) into a 'fostering of otherness' which moves beyond the individualism of liberalism into a recognition of difference at an institutional level - thus requiring a 'pluralistic politics', starting with local narratives contextualized and elaborated within a broader cultural framework. Fraser (1986) talks of a concept of the 'concrete collective other' (cited in White, 1991, p. 106), yet White fears this may lead to group competition for power rather than establishing an ethical heterogeneity. Minimal norms of 'legitimate' action must be defined within White's proposal and he sees these arising from a starting point of a shared communicative endeavour. Yet within this agenda I wrestle still with the notion of power to define these 'norms' and White starts his point of departure from an already 'deconstructed' liberal state, challenged by the contingencies of postmodernism. His book Political Theory and Postmodernism is a beginning in the articulation of 'justice' within a context of pluralism (for another view articulating 'justice' see MacIntyre (1981), After Virtue).