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Archived Issues MASSEY is published by Massey University, Private Bag 11-222, Palmerston North, New Zealand Advertising: |
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An infected piggery can infect animals as
much as 50 kilometres downwind. The
one good thing about this strain in Britain
is that it is not a strain that goes particularly
well in pigs. There have been very few pig
farms infected, so it has spread mainly cattle
to cattle or sheep to cattle, says Morris.
Within days of the first diagnosis an invited
team from the EpiCentre and MAF were on British
soil. Morris was ensconced in Whitehall. Later
on began the process of entering the details
of every British farm, every nuance of the
landscape, and every infected herd into the
EpiMAN programme, making for the most complete
inventory of the British countryside since
the Domesday book.
Even now, at the end of each British working
day the data from the epidemic is sent through
to Massey to be processed during the New Zealand
working day in time for the British morning.
(The British had bought EpiMAN in 1998, but
matters such as BSE had intruded and it had
never been fully deployed. The first planned
exercise using the software a swine
fever epidemic simulation was to have
been held in September 2001.)
Pyres of burning animals, palls of smoke blackening
the sky, near-military measures around farms,
the widespread use of antiseptic foot and
tyre baths and the closure of vast swathes
of countryside, do not marry well with the
popular Constable-landscape chocolate-box
conception of Britain, nor does the wholesale
slaughter of stock with the British soft-focus
infatuation with animals. The measures used
against foot and mouth caused widespread revulsion.
Phoenix, the limpid-eyed calf reprieved from
slaughter after a public outcry, may have
represented a turning point.
Helen Benard, of the EpiCentre, went in with
a New Zealand veterinary rescue team in early
April. For three weeks she worked in a divisional
office in Stafford. When a property was found
to be infected a death sentence for
its livestock she and her British colleagues
would have to recommend which adjacent properties
would have their stock slaughtered. On one
occasion she was called out for a second opinion
on whether the lesions on animals were foot
and mouth.
Its not easy. If you are too soft,
more animals will die than have to. It sounds
terrible, she says, embarrassed at her
severity, but you cant be too
soft.
So you are not too popular within the
office: you are making these recommendations
and other people are having to carry them
out and sometimes not understanding the reasons
why. Sometimes you would be openly criticised
in the local newspapers as well. Misty
the Goat Murdered by MAF was a not untypical
local headline, run under an affecting photo
of the late Misty herself.
Helen, though a veteran of responses to the
Varoa bee mite outbreak in New Zealand and
to an outbreak of classical swine fever in
the Netherlands, found the British epidemic
a dispiriting experience.
Would the stamp it out policy
be countenanced if there were another outbreak?
Morris is candid: I think it would be
difficult to manage another major epidemic
of this scale in the way that has been done,
simply because of what people have seen and
what has happened. The problem is that this
is the best way of handling an epidemic of
this nature.
Our analysis shows that if they stopped
slaughtering stock and started vaccinating
there would have, by now, been about 6,000
farms infected and that the epidemic would
probably have lasted five to 10 years.
In Britain, on the day that this was
diagnosed, there was one known abattoir infected
and there were 29 unknown farms as
we now know. At the height of the epidemic,
which was 27 March, there were 707 known infected
farms and 342 unknown infected farms. The
epidemic kept well ahead of them.
We looked at every known alternative
for using a vaccine and we could not see a
way of checking the epidemic.
When I am talking to colleagues in Thailand
I hammer them with vaccination, vaccination,
vaccination. Thats because the disease
is endemic there. The only way we could have
used the vaccine effectively would have been
to say, right the disease is endemic
in the UK, and that would have been
much more damaging than what we call the stamping
out policy.
Morris dismisses the tempting notion that
foot and mouth disease, BSE, swine fever and
the other ills that have afflicted British
farming of late can somehow be ascribed to
some deeper malaise.
The British farming system is not inherently
worse. What has produced this is the globalisation
of trade and the movement of people, animals
and products around the world, he says.
The EEU in general and Britain in particular
have said we are committed to free trade.
On multiple occasions material has been brought
in that has been responsible for these outbreaks.
And what of New Zealand? We are, he says,
the best prepared country in the world for
an
emergency like foot and mouth. We are
very reliant on our trade, so we would take
the necessary measures to deal with it. And
we have strong border protection systems,
he says. But he sounds a caution: The
weakness that we have, and it concerns me
greatly, is that the reason why you get big
epidemics is that the disease is detected
late. Thats what happened in the British
foot and mouth epidemic, thats what
happened in the Netherlands with classical
swine fever. Our surveillance systems for
the detection of disease are not, I believe,
up to the level they should be. So if we detected
a disease late, we could also have a very
serious and large-scale outbreak.
Of course New Zealand itself is not free of
serious endemic animal diseases. TB in cattle
is one, the reservoir of infection being New
Zealands many millions of possums. One
of Morris ambitions is to arrive at
a better way of controlling possum-transmitted
TB.
Morris work has found that the last
six weeks of a TB-infected possums life
when it is groggy and behaving erratically
are when it is most likely to be nosed
by some curious cow. He found sick possums
usually sleep in patches of scrubby bush.
These can be identified by satellite, and
by keeping cattle away from such areas in
winter and summer, when the possums are at
their most infectious, and by poisoning in
autumn and spring, the risk of TB infection
can be minimised. Not that this is good enough.
More ingeniously, Morris has plans for a self-administered
aerosol vaccine for possums, which will be
attracted by a cinnamon scent.
Alert to the applications for such a technology,
Morris talks of other instances where wildlife
acts as a reservoir for disease and couldbe
a candidate for self-vaccination: the badgers
that carry TB, the foxes that carry rabies.
And that, for this interview, is it. There
is that sense that Morris epidemiologist,
ecologist, veterinarian, raiser of venture
capital, practised interview subject really
should be going. His attention has been
unwavering, but other matters call.
I actually have so much work I have
subcontracted my university role to another
epidemiologist, he says. I had
so much international work I couldnt
cope otherwise.
More than
virus protection software...
This is probably the biggest single
software development group for animal health
and production in the world, says Morris,
speaking of the EpiCentre Software Development
Group. Eight software developers, a group
manager and full-time software tester are
employed developing software.
We have a software company and we market
software globally. We have software in everything
from Chinese to Polish, says Morris.
EpiMAN, which has been so effective in predicting
the course of the foot and mouth epidemic,
also has versions customised for TB and classical
swine fever.
Other products in the complement of software
are: PossPop: a geographical model that simulates
the spread of tuberculosis in a possum population
for a farm or user-defined areaDairyWIN: a
day-to-day herd management programme for dairy
farmers, veterinarians and farm advisersCowPAD:
an add-on to DairyWIN that runs on a Palm
Pilot, allowing farmers to enter and update
herd data while in the fieldPigWin: pig production,
management and monitoring software.
Disease Spread: a generic computer model of
disease control in a national livestock population.
Under development is HandiRisk, a package
for import risk analysis, and EpiMAN (Food
Safety), for which Morris, in another of his
roles, is looking for venture capital.
We are working on a food-tracking system.
We are working with a group of European co-operators.
My colleague, Peter Davies is just in Europe
at the moment working on a plan for a food
safety management system to reduce the risks
of food-borne disease. I am trying to put
together a New Zealand end to the project,
and a European end, and trying to get $10
to 15 million to invest in development and
commercialisation in the hope that it will
return several hundred million to NZ, because
we are the world leaders in doing this kind
of thing and I think we can claim our technology
is the best in the world.
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