Imagining otherwise: Deleuze, disability & *Second Life*

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Abstract

This paper contends that disability should be appreciated as a unique articulation of difference: as a dividuation of the life-force that constitutes all human beings. The paper takes up a Deleuzean ontology, in which people are specific modifications of difference and, as such, 'disability' per se cannot be conceived as located in a single body or subjectivity. Rather, disability needs to be understood as a context-specific articulation of omnipresent difference. In advancing this argument, the paper develops an original theoretical inquiry into the politics of disability and Second Life. The work undertaken here is twofold. Firstly, the authors undertake a case study of a discussion about disability and accessibility that occurred on a member blog hosted on an information technology website and also a 'listserv' email post to a Second Life interest group. Secondly, a Deleuzian ontology is taken up as a means for thinking

outside the political paradox demonstrated by the vernacular discussion about disability and accessibility that occurred on the member blog and listserv. The Deleuzian perspective put forward here offers a starkly contrasted way of thinking 'otherwise', in which no bodies are more 'able' than others, rather, all bodies are different and context produces 'disability'. Here, difference is seen as inherently valuable and as being expressed in bodies in diverse ways. Through a creative approach to re-imagining the case study examples, the authors explore what the world of Second Life might look like from a Deleuzian perspective.

Introduction

This paper advances a particular theoretical inquiry into the politics of disability and *Second Life*[1]. The work undertaken here is twofold. While both lines of inquiry speak to each other, they should also be read as able to stand alone in their own right. Firstly, we undertake a located case study of a discussion about disability and accessibility that occurred on one of the member blogs hosted on an information technology website and a 'listserv' email post to a *Second Life* interest group. We do so in order to comment on the prejudice and anger that results from the quotidian understandings of disability and human rights that are performed in this discussion. Secondly, we take up a Deleuzian ontology as a means for thinking outside the political paradox demonstrated by the vernacular discussion about disability and accessibility that occurred on the member blog and listserv discussion. We begin with a contextual overview.

Defining our terms of inquiry

As a virtual environment for human exchange, *Second Life* is a forum for a diverse spectrum of user experiences. It is a space that facilitates varied kinds of engagement for people who identify as disabled. Bodies who see themselves as physically, intellectually or psychologically 'disabled' outside virtual environments log on to *Second Life* and encounter the technology and identity politics of this online community in different ways. In addition, within *Second Life,* a new trajectory of disablement is established. For example, some users' experience of the *Second Life* technology is disabling. Other users, many of whom identify as being disabled outside *Second Life*, navigate *Second Life* very successfully[2]. In so doing, they might choose

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[1] *Second Life* is a 3D virtual world. It enables participants to create identities in the form of 'avatars' that are visual and auditory bodies created within the computer world. These bodies interact with others in an immersive environment.

[2] For some participants or residents, 3D virtual worlds such as *Second Life* have allowed them to interact socially, shop, run businesses, access information in ways not possible in their 'real life'. For example, Cassidy (2007)

to reconstruct their virtual identity to align to the real world, by purchasing a wheelchair for their avatar, by joining a disability rights group or by attending disability specific gatherings. For example, Simon Stevens is the founder of 'Wheelies', a social network of almost 600 residents and a nightclub where people who use wheelchairs 'hang out' each week in *Second Life*. While Stevens chooses to remain a wheelchair in virtual life (See *Is this a real life, is this just fantasy?* 2007, para. 5), others like Susan Brown prefer to leave their wheelchairs behind to experience *Second Life* as walking avatars (Stein, 2007, para. 31); others experiment with different identities, alternating the gender of their avatar and sometimes the species (from human form to animal) between visits. Changing the appearance of Wilde Cunningham, a well-known *Second Life* avatar identity, has, for example, been enjoyable for the nine adults with severe disabilities who control Wilde. Lilone Sandgrain is a 'real life' day care worker and the hands and voice for the group (*Live2Give: Mascot's Musings,* 2005). Sandgrain organises Wilde, the avatar, to perform the wishes of the nine adults whom he/she embodies in *Second Life*. Such operations not only have clear practical implications for the lives of those involved, they also speak provocatively to notions of multiple subjectivity, in a post-structural theoretical climate that has embraced the death of the (singular) subject. Here, we want to gesture to the rich array of material that exists about disability and *Second Life.* Other users who identify as being disabled outside *Second Life* choose to construct their virtual identity as being without disability.

In gesturing towards these broad fields of experience we make two points. Firstly: the terrain of disability and *Second Life* extends well beyond the located discussion we advance in this paper. The area of people with a disability using *Second Life* as a recreational place and site for community building is a cultural location of significance, which requires further detailed study. We are not attempting to speak to such a comprehensive cultural site in this paper. Secondly, the construction of disability within *Second Life* − both the experience of disability for the embodied user and also the virtual identity of the disabled 'avatar' − is an area of contemporary

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argues that *Second Life* has provided residents David Wallace and student Niels Schuddeboom, both of whom are wheelchair users, with "an outlet for creative expression" (Cassidy, 2007). For many, *Second Life* has proved to be a viable alternative to 'real life' employment, enabling residents like Nanci Schenkein to operate their businesses through a virtual medium (*Is this a real life, is this just fantasy?* 2007).

cultural significance ripe for investigation. Our inquiry does not specifically focus on either of these issues. However, our work does offer a theoretical perspective through which studies in both these areas might be advanced. We do not explore the complexity of these issues in detail here, and see our two lines of inquiry in this paper as somewhat distinct from a more general inquiry into the field of disability and *Second Life*.

Case study: A member blog and listserv discussion of accessibility and disability in Second Life

Despite the potential of 3D worlds, there are many who are unable to share in immersive virtual experiences because of the technological barriers that have yet to be bridged. Judy Brewer, Director of the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative, outlined some of the challenges during her presentation at an 'in world' public conference held in June 2007, in which she described the pleasurable experience of her acquired virtual abilities (cited in Qi, 2007, para. 4). In the same speech, Brewer also articulated the limitations of the environment for users with visual disabilities, those with hearing impairments and users with cognitive or neurological difficulties. Brewer, while acknowledging that accessibility software does exist, noted the need for an environment that would enable *Second Life* content creators to more easily create accessible spaces. Similar concerns have been echoed by Hiroshi Kawamura, President of the Daisy Consortium, who expresses concern that there is a potential split in the disability community over the new technologies. As Kawamura explains:

> To some disability groups, *Second Life* is wonderful. They can participate in a world accessible to them without having a disability. Of course, *Second Life* is completely inaccessible to blind people right now. Whether or not it is just *Second Life*, it is emblematic of a handful of issues that surround the Web 2.0 phenomena. They are:
> - Highly visual content, multimedia, maps
> - User-created content (an increasing phenomena, with a wide variety of accessibility)
> - Disproportionate cost compared to the benefit (we can't ask Flickr photo sharing users to describe a billion photos) (Kawamura cited in Fruchterman, 2007, para. 2).

Herein lies a paradox: One the one hand, 3D virtual worlds such as *Second Life* are exciting and pleasurable for some users, on the other hand, some people with certain

forms of sensory and cognitive impairments are largely excluded from such participation. Arguably, the most significant barrier to accessibility in an environment that is primarily user-generated is not technological, but is rather, the attitudes of the community. Web content accessibility guidelines have been in existence for almost a decade (*World Wide Web Consortium: Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 1.0,* 1999), yet studies undertaken by the UK Disability Rights Commission (2005), Red Cardinal (2006) and the United Nations Department (2006) have shown that "there is a global failure to provide the most basic level of web accessibility for people with disabilities" (*United Nations Global Audit of Web Accessibility,* 2006). As Mitcham pointed out over a decade ago, "the problems with design are not just technical or aesthetic, but also ethical" (1995, p. 187). Just as these technologies have the capacity to link users isolated by disability, geographical location and social circumstances, those who can benefit the most are being excluded.

This paradox is explored by Annable, Goggin and Stienstra (2007) who ponder the question of why it is that technologies that can be so productive for people with disabilities, through "activating human rights, citizenship, and the possibilities of everyday life" (p.145), are still disabling. Goggin and Newell (2007) extend this discussion further in considering the power relations of disability within the broader cultural and social context. As they argue, "people with disabilities still face a long struggle to be accepted in society, as equal members of their national communities and cultures" (Goggin and Newell, 2007, p.166). It is not surprising, in the wake of landmark court cases such as the Bruce Lindsay Maguire v Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (2000), and the National Federation of the Blind of California on behalf of their members, and Bruce Sexton v Target Corporation (2007) certifying a class action on behalf of users with visual impairments, that advocates for accessibility resort to political and legal activism to raise community awareness of the rights of people with disabilities. However, as Tremain (2006) points out, "a political movement whose organizing tools are identity-based shall inevitably be contested as exclusionary and internally hierarchical" and effectively extend the very power relations it seeks to contest (p. 194).

Human rights discourse can also give rise to resistance from those outside such "exclusionary" identity-based movements, as evident from postings to Abrahams'

(2006) accessibility blog in response to his proposal that "the equivalent of a class action" should be set up within *Second Life* to make the environment more accessible for users with disabilities (para. 7). While Abrahams (2007) later reported his proposed class action was "a little tongue in cheek", and was designed to raise awareness of the importance of particular issues, the discussion captured our imaginations because of the ways in which discursive frames of reference specific to a human rights discourse were taken up for reasons ostensibly antithetical to the ethos of human rights. Yet what concerned us more, and as such prompted this paper, was the lack of frameworks that can be drawn upon in order to unpack the complexities of spaces like *Second Life* in relation to issues of disability. Human rights discourse does not need to be the only vehicle through which discussions pertaining to disability are advanced (Tremain, 2006). While this point has been advanced in scholarship elsewhere (Putnam, 2005; Stein and Waterstone 2006), we wanted to explore the possibilities afforded by a Deleuzian ontology. Deleuze's work offers an approach that is conceptually different from a human rights perspective. For example, article one of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:

> All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* 1948)

A Deleuzian rendition of such a statement might read: "All human beings are born different. This difference must be celebrated and, indeed, revered, as it is the foundation of life itself. In becoming more 'themselves' human beings become different from their (younger) selves. Change, and difference, or differentiation, is the ground upon which humans come to be and come to know themselves and others. As such, it is the heart of all things". With such an ontology in mind, we read the discussion below and wondered how it could have been otherwise if it was conducted within a framework that valued difference for itself. Within Deleuze's thought there are no 'sovereign' individuals who act upon the world; there are only bodies that are produced through their contexts and connections with the world. Ethics, for Deleuze, is about maximising the capacities of all bodies to affect and to be affected. It is also about affirming difference and the production of the new. Rather than limiting the future to what is already known, ethics involves opening up the potential for the

unknown. Such a perspective offers a fresh approach from which to engage with disability in *Second Life*. We share such a process of engagement with you in the following case study.

Abrahams' original 2006 posting to his accessibility blog was based on his view that *Second Life*, as a "place where everyone is as able as each other" (2006, para. 2) should be accessible to those with "severe vision impairments". Despite the reported liberating experiences of those who identify as having mobility impairments (for example Brown cited in Stein, 2007; Brewer cited in Qi, 2007 and Niels cited in Cassidy, 2007), Abrahams expresses concerns for "real lifers" who are effectively "debarred" because of the lack of accessibility of the *Second Life* interface for users with sensory impairments. One might have expected a sympathetic audience in response to Abrahams' proposal to set up a class action within *Second Life* to bring about changes to the interface design, given the documented positive experiences of users such as Niels, who is also known as Niles Sopor in *Second Life*, in the quote following. However, the responses to Abrahams' proposal are typified by the second of the quotes below posted by Giovanni Liberty.

> Known as Niles Sopor in the 3D virtual world called 'Second Life', Niels has found an opportunity to forget his disability and experience walking life through his avatar. "Perhaps the most profound difference I have experienced is that people have treated me differently" he said. "In real life, due to my wheelchair and lack of physical coordination, people often regard me as intellectually as well as physically disabled." (cited in Cassidy 2007, para. 4).

> 14th November 2006, 'Giovanni Liberty', referring to accessibility in 'Second Life', said:
> "Look, instead of helping visually impaired people play a game, why not get a drive together to donate computers to poor people? Only 6 out of 10 households have PC's, and if you don't have a PC you can't play Second Life at all. The way I see it, the visually impaired groups have it better than the 'I'm too poor to get a PC group'. Start with the poor people first if you must take up a cause" (cited in Abraham, 2006, Readers Comments section, para. 2).

For us, this juxtaposition between perspectives raises interesting questions. Can Niles Sopor's 'profound experience' of being treated so differently in *Second Life* and 'real'

life, be equated, as it is within the context of 'Giovanni Liberty's' sweeping statement, to the idea of '*taking up a cause*'? Giovanni thinks that being disability inclusive is a luxury that *Second Life* can't afford. Yet the experiences of inclusion that Niles has enjoyed in *Second Life* appear to have been life changing. Can the work that *Second Life* has done in shifting Niles' lifelong experience of being read as intellectually disabled in 'real' social situations be quantitatively valued? And compared with donating computers to poor people? Changes such as those detailed by Niles above can have profound affects on people's subjectivities. While Giovanni lumps poverty, disabilities, geography and politics together in his quote, he does so without regard for qualitative experience. Giovanni is offering a quotidian take on an egalitarian position: everyone should have an 'equal opportunity' in life. A Deleuzian perspective suggests that such a proposition is simply impossible. Disability and difference are empirical examples of the fact that people are not born the same, we are not 'equal'. Rather, we are different.

Taken together, the two quotations with which we begin this case study gesture towards some of the problems presented by the ways in which disability in *Second Life* is conceptualised in vernacular, or 'everyday' ways. For some people living with a disability, *Second Life* effects overwhelmingly positive experiences of connection and personal growth. Yet others, living with different kinds of disabilities, are excluded from *Second Life*. At a surface level, this exclusion seems unethical, but even less ethical are the ways in which disabled bodies are conceived within limits that lead to the neo-liberal 'rights'-based discourses that are being generated on *Second Life,* such as the position articulated by Giovanni Liberty above. Within such discourses, people with some disabilities are positioned as 'holding back' the experiences of other users. Further, rights-based discourses suggest that technology should not be developed in an accessible way, because expending effort on making such changes to *Second Life* would take energy away from advancing the *Second Life* experiences of non-disabled users. There is no appreciation, let alone a celebration, of difference being performed here. Rather, a competitive individualism, in which one person might be better than another, is being held at the core of discussion. If these approaches were replaced with a Deleuzian ontology, the key quotes we introduced above might read as follows:

"Known as Niles Sopor in the 3D virtual world called 'Second Life', Niels has found an opportunity to intensify his experience of difference through his avatar. Niels explains one way in which he encounters an intensity of difference in Second Life through stating that: "Perhaps the most profound difference I have experienced is that people have treated me differently" he said. "In real life, due to my wheelchair and my physical specificities, people often regard me as intellectually as well as physically very different.""

14th November 2006, 'Giovanni Liberty', referring to accessibility in 'Second Life', said:
"Look, instead of assisting visually impaired people in playing a game, why not redesign the game so it can be played by visually impaired people without any assistance? Clearly there are possibilities for technology that have not yet been explored. The way I see it, the visually impaired groups have the possibility to redefine how we imagine gaming, as the sensory and auditory would need to be fore grounded. We need to give up the notion of 'taking up a cause' and start thinking about the ways in which diversity in the community prompts new developments in technology"

As we suggest in the playful re-imagining of quotations above, Deleuze's thought offers a model for moving beyond rights-based discourses. It is, in many respects, the opposite of an egalitarian perspective. Here, ethical movement is concerned with maximising and appreciating differences, deriving pleasure from difference and the new understandings that it engenders. As we suggested above, there are no 'sovereign' individuals who act upon the world. There are, however, bodies that are produced through their contexts and connections with the world. For example, the body of a *Second Life* user is modulated in relation to their experiences in the virtual world. The avatar connects with other people's avatars. An assemblage of technologies is created across these avatars and their 'real life' users, and this assemblage modulates effects that change 'real life' emotions. Body, mind and context are always/already part of a complex network of differences.

Thinking 'difference' ethically: Moving beyond sad passions

One of the practical implications that would arise from adopting a Deleuzian perspective to thinking about disability in *Second Life* is that, rather than limiting the future to what has already been, or to what is already known, Deleuzian ethics involves opening up the potential for the unknown. For example, discussions about

hearing impaired users in *Second Life* show some ways in which affirming difference increases the capacity to act of not only the hearing impaired uses, but also the *Second Life* users without hearing impairment who advocate the use of assistive technologies. Currently, hearing impaired users have also encountered profoundly unethical – if not damaging- situations, in which:

> "People described their own experiences of being excluded, or else sought to marginalise others, in ways such as:
>
> Declaring exclusion (e.g. talking about the "ongoing problem" of being ignored, that the deafness will require non-use of voice to be explained over and over again, claiming that Linden Labs [the corporation who own *Second Life*] should have consulted with hearing impaired users but did not, talking about "your kind" or "your friends", by claiming that people who only speak "obscure" languages are unable to participate in many discussions)
>
> Expressing discomfort (e.g. someone who had identified themselves as hearing impaired declaring that deaf mute status was "embarrassing and humiliating", by suggesting that alternative reasons such as technical problems should be given for opting out of voice instead of admitting a hearing impairment)" (Oliver, 2007, Section "Ways of Excluding", paras. 1-3).

Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's ethics offers us useful tools through which to understand the social and political implications of such acts of discrimination. In explaining the core principals of Spinoza's philosophy of ethics, Deleuze (1988, p.28) argues that ethics cannot be separated from Spinoza's conception of consciousness, values and sad passions. These "three practical theses concerning consciousness, values and the sad passions" (1988, p.28) constitute building blocks for Spinoza's philosophy. The first of these concepts, the illusion of consciousness, is the idea that the lived awareness of consciousness is a fiction. Rather than being the 'origin' of one's own thoughts and actions, human beings *are* the affects that our thoughts and actions have on us. Through acting, people create themselves. Individuals are produced by their interactions with the world. While we can think 'person' and 'context', for Spinoza, the ways a person acts and thinks are not separable from their context. Deleuze takes up this first principle of Spinozan thought – the belief that we *are* the affects that our thoughts and actions have upon us. He employs this idea to

replace the Cartesian notion that our consciousness is the location *from* which our thoughts and actions arise. For Deleuze, then, subjectivity is produced, not given. For *Second Life* users, their virtual experience is part of their subjectivity both on and off line – and the nature of these experiences has impacts that inform their future actions. They are part of processes of subjectivation.

The second aspect of Deleuze's thought in which he draws significantly on Spinoza, as well as Nietzsche (1978, 1990), is his critique of morality as opposed to ethics; his assessment of the cultural production of values. For Spinoza (2001) and Nietzsche (1978, 1990), Good and Evil are fictions created by a world-view grounded in transcendent beliefs, rather than in the practical world. Deleuze argues that 'transcendent' thought is expressed via Kant's philosophy[3], orthodox religion, and psychoanalysis (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 1987, 1996). These three forums respectively create a 'transcendent moralism' that reduces people's power to act – or engage with practical specificities as cause for action. We would like to contend that negative representations of people with disabilities as unworthy of 'inclusion', or as 'holding back' the mainstream, can act as transcendent knowledges of disability, in which disability is produced as 'other', as 'special', 'scary', extraordinary and in need of control or repair. For example, note the language in the 'listserv' posting reproduced below. Phrases such as "wings of hope"; "wheelchair bound"; and the sentence "how SL helps the disabled" suggests the proposed publication might be furthering a model of thought in which disability is produced as 'other', rather than a particular articulation of universal difference.

> **"From:** educators-bounces@lists.secondlife.com
> [mailto:educators-bounces@lists.secondlife.com]
> **On Behalf Of** *(Author's name removed).*
> **Sent:** Monday, 21 April 2008 11:33 PM
> **To:** SL Educators
> **Subject:** RE: [SLED] Coping with disabilities
>
> The SL based magazine, Wings of Hope will have its next issue covering disabilities, in RL and SL. If anyone on this list is interested in profiling their work in SL or their own personal story about how SL helped them or someone else, please respond to me asap offlist.

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[3] See Deleuze (1984) on Kant's philosophy.

> Our deadline is looming but since this topic came up, I didn't want to miss out on some potential stories from this group. We will have a story about Joseph Button, a doctor who has written an article about how SL helps the disabled, plus many more articles. One of our staff members is wheel chair bound and will be on our cover with an SL twist to it.
>
> This magazine has many readers from RL who are not in SL and we want to educate them how virtual reality helps the disabled. Now is the time you can promote your work. Please pass this on to someone you know who may also work with the disabled and is not on this list.
>
> Thanks,
> *(Author's name removed)*
> "Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart."
> - Colossians 3:23"

Essentialising beliefs about people with disabilities such as those performed in the passage above (they are in need, disabled people are lacking, are dependant) not only limit the capacities of people with disabilities to act upon others but also foreclose ways in which they may be acted upon by others. The pleasure and independence experienced by people with a disability who use and enjoy *Second Life* radically displaces transcendent ideas of disability as a signifier of need, which are created within vernacular discourses such as the call for contributions quoted above. We argue that *Second Life* users who advocate that virtual spaces can 'free' people from disability, suggesting that disability is something one would categorically wish to be without, reduce their own capacity to act.

The third aspect of Spinoza's thought that Deleuze adopts in his fashioning of an ethics is the call to reject the 'sad passions'. These 'sad passions' are affects that erode life. Deleuze explains them through saying:

> Sadness will be any passion whatsoever which involves a diminution of my power of acting, and joy will be any passion involving an increase in my power of acting. … Here you understand well that he [Spinoza] does not take sadness in a vague sense, he takes sadness in the rigorous sense he knew to give it: *sadness is the affect insofar as it involves the diminution of my power of acting* . (Deleuze, 1978, emphasis added).

An everyday example of a sad affect in *Second Life* can be found in the relationship between people who think there is nothing to be gained from inclusive technology and culture in *Second Life.*

More than any other group in *Second Life* today, people with profound cognitive, motor, sensory, auditory or visual disabilities experience disadvantage to the point of exclusion. Attempts at disability-inclusive technological development seem little able to alter this situation and, equally, the lack of attention given to implementing accessible ethical web use policy compounds this situation. Interwoven with this situation is a neo-liberal, rights-based discourse in which people with disabilities who are experiencing access problems are either silenced by their physical exclusion, or are criticised for holding back other users. For example, hearing impaired users, when lobbying for assistive technology, faced the suggestion that:

> the hearing impaired get by fine at movies and in the rest of their life so should just get on with things here, that deaf people probably didn't like it when sound was added to movies (Oliver, 2007, bullet point 4 in "Ways of excluding" section).

Deleuze (1997, p.243) describes the interpersonal dynamics of such sad affects with insight. He states: "affections rooted in sadness are linked to one another … and this in such a way that our power of action is further and further diminished, tending towards its lowest degree". Sorrow and fear of difference and change are self-perpetuating emotions. They arise from acts prompted by the feeling that one's actions will have no positive impact, whatever they are, so one may as well act for self-serving purposes. In such methods of thought, individuals are positioned in competition with one another. This should be replaced with an understanding of individuals as unique: as dividual expressions of a milieu of difference.

Concluding remarks on an exercise in imagining otherwise

We contend that disability should be appreciated as an articulation of difference: the life-force upon which all humans depend. Within a Deleuzean ontology we are all varying modifications of differences. To suggest that disability can be equated with deficit is to generate sad affect and limit one's capacity to act. Deleuze explains this culmination of negativity, or sad affect, through stating:

> …out of sadness is born a desire which is hate. This desire is linked with other desires, other passions: antipathy, derision, contempt, envy, anger and so on (Deleuze 1997, p.243).

A rejection of sad passions, a facilitation of joy and belief in the practical over the transcendental, can be taken as three guiding features of ethics as practice, or an ethical movement. The bodies that strive to attain 'active affections' are, in Deleuzian thought, ethical bodies. Being 'ethical' is a mode of performance; an application of the principle of creating different ways of operating that are specific to a given situation. This performative aspect (the *doing*), and the broader contextual change which is effected by performance, is the 'activation' of ethics. The practice of ethics, being *ethical,* entails a preference for certain affects or outcomes – specifically, the enhancing of potentiality. Acting ethically means one does not evaluate an assemblage or body in terms of what is internal to it (inherently Good or Bad) or what it 'is'. Rather, one focuses on what it can do, or what it produces. Any evaluation of what an assemblage produces needs to take into consideration not only the impact of the assemblage on the bodies within that assemblage – but also on bodies which surround it.

In this paper we have begun to explore what the world of *Second Life* might look like through a Deleuzian lens. In undertaking this exploration we have re-written the discussion that formed our case study example, in an attempt to counter the limited and, in our terms, unproductive relationship between technology and disability that was performed throughout the discussion. We have undertaken this experiment because playing in ways of thinking otherwise is a necessary precursor to things becoming-other.

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