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*Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development*

**Final Report**

**The role of marae and Māori  
communities in post-disaster recovery:  
a case study**

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## Summary information

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## Executive summary

This report presents the findings, discussion and conclusions drawn from research into the role of Poupatate Marae and the Māori community in the Manawatu District of the Manawatu-Wanganui Region during the February 2004 flood. In particular, the study examines the effectiveness of various approaches in providing information, reducing stress and anxiety, and facilitating an effective recovery process. Our intention is that the study contribute to improving emergency policy development, planning and management, particularly with respect to marae and Māori communities.

### **Methodology**

A number of complementary information-gathering methods were employed in order to review relevant archive material, consult with individuals and groups involved with Poupatate Marae during the 2004 flood, and extract major themes and issues.

### **Findings: research-based evidence**

Participants were relocated to the marae for safety reasons, and to gain access to marae resources. The marae relied on resources contributed by whānau during this period. External participants described the central role played by other marae in the region and outlined a variety of difficulties Māori communities faced during this period, including isolation, health problems and damage to housing. The main issues identified by participants were: relationships, communication, stress, recovery and reimbursement.

Participants highlighted a lack of meaningful interaction between the district council, marae and Māori community, and a lack of Māori 'presence' within the district.

A lack of communication was identified between civil defence groups and Poupatate Marae. Although poor communication was identified as a problem across the region, channels of communication between civil defence groups, marae and Māori communities varied from district to district.

Participants employed various strategies to reduce stress levels. Stress was reduced by virtue of being at the marae, and *whanaungatanga* and 'marae-style' counselling helped to alleviate stress.

Participants across the study highlighted the need to increase awareness between Māori communities and civil defence and emergency management groups of their differing practices and processes. Participants also emphasised the importance of a face-to-face approach to recovery and revealed their perception that civil defence planning excludes Māori input.

Māori perspectives on reimbursement showed that applying for compensation was not always regarded as appropriate. Compensation for the contributions made by marae across the region was uneven.

### **Suggestions for effective approaches**

Effective approaches that may be considered for future emergency management for Māori communities centre on utilising the marae as a focal point, relationship-building, knowledge exchange, representation, communication and planning.

In an emergency, marae form a focal point not only for the local Māori community, but also for civil defence teams. Participants stressed the need to differentiate the needs of a marae in an emergency situation from the needs of whānau, and

suggested a number of ways that the centrality of marae to emergency response and recovery efforts could be more fully exploited.

Participants emphasised the importance of relationship building in laying the foundations for a successful emergency response. Participants suggested potential approaches which could be adopted to facilitate relationship building including a 'partnership' approach and developing relationships between councils and Māori communities.

Participants highlighted gaps in the provision and exchange of information during the emergency, and indicated potential opportunities to improve knowledge transfer, including greater cooperation with civil defence groups.

There was a perception amongst many of the participants, both external and internal, that better Māori representation was necessary at decision-making levels, including within civil defence groups and councils.

Participants emphasised the importance of a face-to-face approach and the potential for marae to act as focal points to communicate with the wider Māori community. External participants also noted successful developments subsequent to the 2004 flood which have improved communications.

Participants highlighted a number of planning issues that could be addressed through harnessing the participation of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) and Te Puni Kōkiri to consolidate initiatives occurring at local level.

## **Conclusions**

In order to provide guidance to the civil defence and natural hazards sectors on how multi-agency community consultation during and after emergencies should be conducted with respect to marae, the following issues were identified for consideration:

**Marae:** since marae are likely to be the automatic destination during an emergency for, at least, whānau and Māori communities, it is suggested that they be incorporated meaningfully into regional and local civil defence policy and plans.

**Relationships:** in terms of developing emergency policy and planning, it is clear that consultation specifically with marae and Māori communities should take place. This may involve hui held for marae, Māori community groups and local councils to properly 'voice' perspectives and identify pathways forward.

**Knowledge:** an exchange of information about marae locations, contact people and services available from Māori service providers will expand options available to civil defence groups to provide for not only marae and Māori communities, but the wider community as well.

**Representation:** for the purposes of preparing and providing for marae and Māori communities for an emergency, an appropriate Māori voice is required to inform current civil defence policy and procedure.

**Communication:** working lines of communication should be established and practiced between marae and the Māori community and local councils prior to an emergency.

**Stress:** whānau and the wider community should be familiarised with marae and their protocols, particularly to identify some of the stress-relieving practices that occur on marae.

**Recovery:** knowledge and experiences of the approaches adopted by Māori communities and civil defence should be shared to be developed for any future event.

**Reimbursement:** knowledge exchange between local councils and tikanga Māori on matters relating to reimbursement and recovery after an emergency can facilitate compensation procedures.

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# 1. Introduction

This case study examines the role of a marae and Māori communities in the Manawatu during the February 2004 flood (henceforth referred to as the 'Flood Event') and the various approaches they adopted during the event. The marae is Poupatate Marae located at Tokorangi, in the Manawatu-Rangitikei region. However, while the primary focus is Poupatate Marae, the study also incorporates data gathered during the research concerning other marae in the region also affected by the Flood Event.

The study specifically examines the effectiveness of the approaches undertaken to provide information, reduce stress and anxiety, and facilitate a more effective recovery process for marae and Māori communities. It is intended that an outcome of the study will be research-based evidence that informs emergency management policy and planning development by groups within the emergency management sector and by marae and Māori communities themselves.

## 1.1. Background to the study

Effective survival and recovery from disasters depend not just on the physical impacts of the event, but also on how the social environment supports the complex and protracted processes of recovery. The social environment is crucial in determining how well people adapt to stress, change and emergencies. Traumatic events shatter essential assumptions and beliefs that communities and individuals rely on for psychological health - these structural elements of the life and personality are formed in the context of community life and need to be reconstructed by the social environment. Chronic stress during the recovery period which is often over a period of years also erodes and degrades these structures and undermines the social communication processes by which they are maintained and which also deliver social support processes. The recent flooding in New Zealand, especially in February and July 2004, brought to the attention of the emergency management sector the need for multi-organisational and multidisciplinary inputs into the decision-making and recovery processes within communities. It also highlighted the need for effective ways of engaging with the community during and after an emergency to help facilitate and strengthen the recovery process.

In addition, while anecdotal evidence would seem to show that the Māori community played a vital role in the management of some of these recent disaster events, no research to date has explored this particular dynamic - particularly with respect to the Māori community's engagement with local and central government agencies during disaster events.

## 1.2. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to systematically research the experiences of the Flood Event to identify the role played by whānau<sup>1</sup> of Poupatate Marae and Māori communities during the 2004 floods affecting the Manawatu and Wanganui regions.

## 1.3. Objectives

The objectives of the study were as follows:

1. To obtain research-based evidence of the benefits of multi-agency community consultation during and after emergencies for marae;

2. To determine the most effective approaches in the provision of multi-agency community consultation for marae; and
3. To provide guidance to the civil defence and natural hazards sectors on how multi-agency community consultation during and after emergencies should be conducted with respect to marae.

#### 1.4. The report

This report, firstly, provides a background to Poupatate Marae, including its philosophical bases, its governance structures and its relationships. The report then generally describes the 2004 Flood Event and provides some details on the impact of that event on the Manawatu-Wanganui region.

The remainder of the report outlines the findings and analyses of the information gathered during this study. These have been grouped into sections that broadly align with the study's proposed objectives, namely: findings on research-based evidence of experiences during the event; suggestions on 'effective approaches' identified by the study; and some conclusions drawn from an analysis of the data to provide guidance to the civil defence and natural hazards sectors on how multi-agency community consultation during and after emergencies should be conducted with respect to marae and Māori communities.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this report, the term "whānau" is used to refer to those individuals and groups of Māori communities within the Manawatu-Rangitikei region that are affiliated with Poupatate Marae, including those that utilised the marae during the Flood Event.

## 2. Poupatate Marae

This section of the report introduces Poupatate Marae. It provides background information on the whakapapa (origins) and philosophical underpinnings of the marae, and on its governance structures and operations.

### 2.1. Whakapapa<sup>2</sup>



Poupatate Marae is located on high ground near the Rangitikei River a short distance from Halcombe (or Kākāriki). Poupatate stands amongst the hills of the Reu Reu Valley within the area known as Tokorangi. The marae complex consists of the wharenuī (meeting house), the whare kai (dining house) with pātaka (storerooms) and cookhouse, and an ablutions block.

The following whakataukī (proverb) signifies the foundation of Poupatate Marae and was uttered by King Tawhiao, the first Māori king of Aotearoa in the nineteenth century:

*Māku ano hei hanga i tōku whare. Ko ngā poupou he mahoe he patete, ko te tāhuhu he hīnau. Me whakatiputipu i te hua o te rengarenga, me whakapakari i te hua o te kawariki.*

The provided translation is:<sup>3</sup>

*I will build my own house. The posts will be of mahoe and patete, the ridgepole of hīnau. The inhabitants will be raised on rengarenga and nurtured on kawariki.*

The whakataukī was used by King Tawhiao to encourage the development of iwi and hapu within Aotearoa. The mahoe, patete and hīnau trees were thought by some to be of lesser value than the more highly prized tōtara, kauri, rimu and such larger tree species. However, the whakataukī is a reminder that in the forest ecosystem all plants are dependent on each other for sustenance and shelter, and this is where their real value lies [mahoe, patete and hīnau]. The rengarenga and the kawariki were used as foods of last resort or when people were on the march.

This whakataukī and its intrinsic principles and values provide the bases upon which the marae was established, and it continues to inform the operations of whānau today.

## 2.2. Governance

The main governing body of Poupatate Marae is the Poupatate Marae Incorporated Society. The Society's objectives include the following:<sup>4</sup>

- To encourage the hapū of Poupatate to adhere to the values and traditions handed down by their tūpuna and uphold the principles of mana tangata, mana whenua, manaaki tangata and tikanga Māori, and to acknowledge the institution of the Kingitanga. The kawa of Poupatate Marae has always been and will remain the kawa of Tainui waka;
- To actively pursue the cultural, social and economic development of Māori;
- To ensure that all buildings, assets, and grounds are maintained to the highest standards;
- To ensure that manuhiri are received according to tikanga;
- To be responsible for applications for grants/funding from government, local bodies and other institutions for the benefit of the marae and/or the members;
- To practice kaitiakitanga for the natural resources and environment in the rohe of Ngāti Pīkiahū ki Poupatate;
- To maintain mutually beneficial relationships with other iwi, and foster strong and effective links with the hapū and institutions of Ngāti Raukawa ki te Tonga and Ngāti Tuwharetoa; and
- To compile and maintain a register of Ngāti Pīkiahū beneficiaries.

The reserve upon which the marae is located is administered by trustees appointed by the Maori Land Court in 1998 under the Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.

The operation of Poupatate Marae continues to be undertaken by the Poupatate Marae Committee.

Poupatate Marae also has a relationship with Te Rūnanga O Raukawa. The Rūnanga is a representative body for whānau and hapu of Ngāti Raukawa and provides health, social service and education to whānau and hapu of Ngāti Raukawa and related iwi. The Rūnanga is promoted as 'an excellent model or working at the social service interface in that it deals effectively with mainstream agencies, and with whānau, hapu and iwi'.<sup>5</sup> Poupatate Marae has representatives that sit on the Rūnanga's governing body. As such, the marae is able to benefit from services that the Rūnanga facilitates and provides.

Poupatate Marae also has a relationship with the Manawatu District Council's Māori Consultative Committee. The Committee was established in 1992 and currently consists of ten marae representatives (including Poupatate Marae), two Council representatives and the Mayor of the Manawatu district. The Committee's key roles have been identified as:<sup>6</sup>

1. Existing as a relationship where information is shared between the Council and the marae of the district.
2. Providing a vehicle for tangata whenua perspectives on Council activities; and
3. Playing an advocacy role for environment issues.

The Committee meets every second month. Marae representatives are nominated for the Committee by their respective marae, including Poupatate Marae.

With respect to the Committee's meetings, the Poupatate Marae Representative described the following:

*We have the committee who sit in the same forum as the Manawatu District Council ... and so all decisions for Māori are made through us, and then we have our own pre-hui and then we report back to the District Council. We meet every two months. They send us out the minutes if there's anything they want us to look at, to discuss in our pre-meeting ..*

### 2.3. Poupatate Marae and floods

Whānau of Poupatate Marae, both past and present, have had previous experience with flooding and its impact on the marae. Poupatate Marae was initially located closer to the Rangitikei River than its current site. However, after a severe flood, the house was consequently moved up to higher land in 1870 to Onepuhi, about 2.5 km from the Onepuhi Bridge. Participants commented that:

*Our maraes were moved because of the floods, and they were flat down on the river bank. So floods like that, they would have been rushed right out, hence the reason why they moved them up on top of the hill and down the road further. There were actually two marae down by the river – Te Tikanga, which is now up on top of the hill, and Poupatate.<sup>7</sup>*

The marae was again relocated at the present site in 1907.<sup>8</sup>

In more recent times, whānau of Poupatate Marae have also had some experience with civil defence and civil defence training. Participants referred to training apparently undertaken by whānau members affiliated with the marae:

*A lot of the marae are hooked up with the civil defence... Poupatate is [a civil defence post] for probably 6 years. Some of the [marae members] came and did civil defence training with [the Manawatu District Council Civil Defence Officer] about 5 years ago. Unfortunately none of them were around when the flood came because they were all in town and couldn't get out there.<sup>9</sup>*

The perception, however, is that 'that not enough resources, time and energy have been spent out there [at Poupatate Marae]' to maintain training and emergency preparedness for Poupatate Marae.<sup>10</sup>

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2 The background to Poupatate Marae has been generously provided by the Poupatate Marae Committee, as primarily recorded in an undated monograph by Frances Arapere about the history of Poupatate Marae.

3 Taken from the Preamble to the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 Rules of Poupatate Marae Incorporated.

4 Incorporated Societies Act 1908 Rules of Poupatate Marae Incorporated.

5 <http://www.raukawa.maori.nz/> (5 February 2007).

6 Lange (2005).

7 Pers. comm. #6, 16 November 2006.

8 Arapere (undated:3).

9 Pers. comm. #6, 16 November 2006.

10 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.

### 3. The February 2004 Flood Event

The following section provides general information and a description of effects of the 2004 Flood Event on the Manawatu-Wanganui region. The extent of inundation is shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This information was obtained from Horizons Regional Council.

#### 3.1. General information on the February 2004 Flood Event

Heavy rainfall in the Manawatu-Wanganui region, from 14–16 February 2004, resulted in severe flooding throughout the region, affecting seventy per cent of the Horizons Regional Council territory. Neighbouring regions were also affected, creating the most devastating flood in the last 100 years and the largest emergency management event in the last 20 years.<sup>11</sup> Rainfall figures for the month prior to the floods were in excess of twice the average for January and February. From the 14-16 February over 200 mm of rainfall was recorded at three sites, and rainfall of over 100mm recorded at 22 sites, over four to six times the usual rainfall for February.<sup>12</sup> Particularly heavy rain in the Tararua and Ruahine ranges led to the Manawatu River overflowing its banks. The peak flow of the Manawatu was the second largest on record, and the peak flow of the Rangitikei River the third largest on record. Along with the flooding, the region was affected by lightning, hail and storm force winds which reached 230 kph in the Tararua Range.<sup>13</sup>


In the early hours of 16 February, Rangitikei and Manawatu both declared a state of emergency, followed by Tararua District Council (0600 hrs), Wanganui District Council (0745 hrs) and Horowhenua District Council (1630 hrs). On 17 February, South Taranaki District Council and then the Manawatu-Wanganui CDEM Group declared a state of emergency for entire Manawatu-Wanganui region, due to widespread damage across the region. This remained in place until 12 p.m. on 24 February.

#### 3.2. Effects of the flooding

In the Manawatu-Wanganui area, four bridges were destroyed, and 21 were seriously damaged. Falling trees and landslips caused further damage, with between 4000 and 6000 km<sup>2</sup> of hill country north of Palmerston North affected. Major highways were blocked, including the Manawatu Gorge which was closed for 75 days. Telecommunications were cut off, with breakdown in both cellphone and landline links, and 15,500 households suffered power outages. Water and gas services were also disrupted. Some remote communities were left without power, communications or access.<sup>14</sup>

There was no loss of life in the storm, but there is evidence of a number of instances when people came close to losing their lives.<sup>15</sup> An estimated 2500 people were displaced, the majority in the Manawatu, Wanganui and Rangitikei districts. Three months after the flood, 400 homes remained uninhabitable, affecting more than 900 people. Over 1000 farms were flood-damaged, leaving 20,000 ha of farmland underwater. Major problems affecting farmers included landslips and silt damage. Recovery teams were faced with difficult access problems as half of the region's roads were closed by floodwaters, slips, fallen trees or power lines.<sup>16</sup>


The economic impact on the region was estimated to be 300 million dollars.<sup>17</sup>



**Figure 3.1** Extent of flooding in the Manawatu-Wanganui Region

Map from Horizons MW





**Figure 3.2** Extent of flooding in the middle Rangitikei river area

Map from Horizons MW

### 3.3. Response and recovery

The Flood Event was significant as it was the first major event to occur since the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act was passed in December 2002. Horizons Regional Council was the only council in the country to have their Government-approved emergency plan, required by the 2002 Act, in place.

Although local authorities in the region faced difficulties such as a lack of information, overloading of communications and the fact that their own offices were affected by the floods in some cases, it was felt that the CDEM Act had enhanced their ability to respond and had given a greater sense of community on Civil Defence matters.<sup>18</sup> A review of the Flood Event comments that:

*A strength of emergency management through the local authorities proved to be their detailed knowledge of the people, geography, infrastructure and hazards in the area as well as access to immediately available resources. Generally this provided a sound basis for early effective response involving the commitment of resources and checking on those at risk.*<sup>19</sup>

Emergency Services were the first to respond to the event, followed by local authorities. Work and Income, supported by the Inland Revenue Department and Housing New Zealand, subsequently established one-stop shops where affected people were able to receive financial support. Non-government agencies involved in the recovery phase included Federated Farmers, Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

There is very little literature available assessing the effect of the event on marae and Maori communities, or the role they played in the response and recovery phase. It is hoped that this case study will give an idea of the impact on one community, but further research is necessary to evaluate the full extent of Maori community involvement.

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11 Flood Review Team (2004:10), Horizons (September 2004: 2).

12 Mulholland et al. (2004:3).

13 Flood Review Team (2004:10).

14 Flood Review Team (2004:10), Horizons (September 2004: 2).

15 Flood Review Team (2004:10).

16 New Zealand Herald 23 May 2004.

[http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c\\_id=624&ObjectID=3567950](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=624&ObjectID=3567950) (26 November 2006).

17 Horizons (September 2004:2).

18 Flood Review Team (2004:18).

19 Flood Review Team (2004:17).

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1. Background

The methodological process adopted for the study was shaped by its purpose, objectives, and formative discussions prior to its commencement. Due to the scope of the study and the range of perspectives anticipated, a number of complementary information gathering methods were employed. These methods were largely qualitative in nature but ensured that all relevant issues were considered in a reliable and valid manner.

To guide and illustrate the research process, a number of secondary research objectives were identified, as detailed below:

1. To consider the ethical implications of the study;
2. To conduct a comprehensive review of relevant archive material;
3. To identify individuals and groups who may have been involved with Poupatate Marae during the Flood Event;
4. To consult with the identified groups and individuals;
5. To compile information gathered from the key consultations and to extract major themes and issues; and
6. To prepare a final report.

The following section provides further detail on these objectives and the methodology employed for the study.

### 4.2. Ethical issues

Ethical issues and considerations are an important initial step in any research activity. At the outset, it was agreed that the study would be conducted in accordance with Massey University's best practice policies and rules of conduct as outlined by the Ethics Committee.

In conducting the study, the major issues of ethical interest were associated with the consultation phase of the research and the requirement to ensure that participants were: a) adequately informed of the study's purpose; b) aware of their role; c) guaranteed anonymity; and d) given the opportunity to receive additional feedback if required.

As a consequence, information sheets describing the study and its aims and objectives were prepared for use during the consultation phase.<sup>20</sup> After each consultation, participants were given the opportunity to raise any outstanding issues or concerns.

### 4.3. Archive review

The study included a review of relevant archive material concerning the Flood Event. This involved reviewing data in electronic and written form gathered from:

- The Poupatate Marae Committee
- Te Rūnanga O Raukawa
- Te Puni Kōkiri (Whanganui Regional Office)
- Palmerston North City Council
- Manawatu District Council
- Horizons Regional Council
- The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
- The media

The nature of the material reviewed included:

- Electronic and written records, including minutes from Welfare Advisory Group meetings, minutes of internal debriefings and electronic communication between local authorities and Māori organisations;
- Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs);
- situation and review reports; and
- newspaper reports.

The data reviewed proved useful in providing background information on the 2004 Flood Event and its impacts, indicating the important issues facing marae and Māori communities, and in helping locate individuals and groups from marae and Māori communities who had involvement with the Flood Event.

It is important, however, to note that much of the documentation gathered relates to the effect of the flood on the whole community (general public), and minimal documentation is available on either the role of marae and Māori communities in disaster planning and recovery in general, or the impact of the 2004 flood on Māori communities themselves. Minutes from many of the recovery group meetings are unavailable, and situation and review reports make only brief reference to the impact on Māori communities. We have therefore relied heavily on key informant interviews to obtain relevant information.

#### 4.4. Participants

While the review provided a basis for this study, it was limited in that the information obtained, while broadly useful, did not exactly match the specific purpose of the research. For qualitative studies, such as this, it is important that a variety of views and perspectives are collected, and sample size is perhaps less important than composition and representation of a range of viewpoints. The consultations undertaken for this study were planned to ensure that a range of views were considered.

Thus, several complementary approaches were used. In addition to organising a focus group, consultations and key informant interviews were also performed.

#### 4.5. Consultations

The first formal consultation for the study was with the Chairman of the Poupatate Marae Committee in October 2006. The ground covered was an outline of the study and its proposed methodology and approach. This provided an opportunity for feedback on the study's purpose, objectives and methodology.

In addition to this, a consultation hui was held with the Poupatate Marae Committee during which a presentation was made on the study, with information sheets and other background material distributed. Participants at that hui were given the opportunity to provide feedback on the study's purpose, objectives, methodology and to raise any concerns they may have had about the study. The Marae Committee agreed to participate in the study, including the proposed focus group and key informant interviews.

These initial consultations provided an opportunity to identify key contact persons at Poupatate Marae. Working with each the key contact person helped to identify key informant and focus group participants.

Following these consultations, an initial list was formulated of participants involved with Poupatate Marae during the 2004 Flood Event:

- The Poupatate Marae Committee
- Te Rūnanga O Raukawa
- Palmerston North City Council
- Manawatu District Council
- Rangitikei District Council
- Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council (Horizons)
- Manawatu District Council Māori Consultative Committee
- Te Puni Kōkiri (Whanganui Regional Office)

#### 4.6. The focus group

At the outset of the study, it was agreed that a focus group would be facilitated to gain information about whānau views and experiences of Poupatate Marae during the Flood Event. The focus group approach was particularly well-suited to obtaining several whānau perspectives and gaining insights into their shared understandings.

It is noted that this approach did not involve interviewing a number of people at the same time, in which case the emphasis would have been on questions and responses between the author and the focus group participants. Rather, the focus was on the interaction within the group based on key concept questions supplied by the researcher, and informed by the study's objectives. Hence, the key characteristic of interest was the information and insight arising from the interaction between the participants.

The focus group was facilitated to draw upon the participants' attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions to the 2004 Flood Event. It provided the participants with more control over the direction of discussion. The format also enabled the study's researcher to gain a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time relative to other methods.

The focus group was held at the offices of Te Rūnanga O Raukawa, on 20 November 2007. Seven people participated in the session, which lasted approximately two hours. Each participant had been actively involved, during the 2004 Flood Event, with Poupatate Marae, Te Rūnanga O Raukawa or the surrounding Māori communities. These backgrounds provided diverse and useful information for the study.

The focus group was semi-structured and open-ended, and was facilitated to ensure data was gathered in the following key areas:

1. The provision of information to and from Poupatate Marae and the Māori community;
2. The reduction of stress at Poupatate Marae and amongst the Māori community;
3. The facilitation of an effective recovery; and
4. Effective approaches for any future emergency event.

Ethical considerations for the focus group were addressed as for the initial consultations. For example, full information about the purpose and uses of participants' contributions was provided. The focus group was facilitated in an honest and open manner, and participants were informed about the expectations of the group and topic, and not put under pressure to speak. Participants were assured of the confidentiality of their contributions, and the group was facilitated in accordance with the kawa of the venue.

For the purposes of this report, feedback from participants of the focus group has been referred to as originating from the 'Participants'.

#### 4.7. Key informant interviews

A key component of the study was face-to-face interviews with key 'informants'. These people were identified during the initial discussions and consultation phases of this study, and also by the focus group participants, and were people who had been involved during the 2004 Flood Event with either Poupatate Marae, the Māori community, or with civil defence operations.

Key informants who were involved directly with Poupatate Marae or Maori communities during the 2004 Flood Event were:

- Whānau that stayed at Poupatate Marae during the 2004 Flood Event;
- Members of the Poupatate Marae Committee;
- Te Rūnanga O Raukawa;
- Manawatu District Māori Consultative Committee; and
- Whānau affiliated with Poupatate Marae.

Five interviews were conducted with members of this group, who are referred to as 'Participants'.

The other key informants were primarily involved with groups or organisations that *interacted with* the marae or Māori community either during or following the Flood Event. This group included individuals from:

- Manawatu District Council;
- Rangitikei District Council;
- Palmerston North City Council;
- Horizons Regional Council;
- February 2004 Flood Review Team; and
- Te Puni Kokiri (Whanganui Regional Office).

Where required, these key informants have been referred to throughout the report as 'External Participants'. Seven interviews were conducted with members of this group.

Initial contact with each key informant was made by a telephone call, and background information on the study was mailed out and discussed prior to the interviews taking place. Face-to-face interviews were carried out, at times and locations suitable to the interviewees. Interviews were designed to explore informants' experiences of the 2004 Flood Event. They were open-ended and semi-structured, with the key areas of interest, in relation to the 2004 Flood Event, being the provision of information, the reduction of stress, the facilitation of an effective recovery, and effective approaches for any future emergency event.

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<sup>20</sup> A copy of the Information Sheet is attached as Appendix 1.

## 5. Findings: research-based evidence

The following section outlines the findings from the review of the archival material, data gathered from the key informant interviews and the focus group.

The data was gathered and analysed in accordance with the project's proposed objectives of obtaining research-based evidence on the benefits of multi-agency community consultation for marae in the Manawatu and Rangitikei regions, particularly Poupatate Marae.

The findings have been outlined in this section according to the following themes:

- marae experiences
- relationships
- communication
- stress
- recovery; and
- reimbursement.

### 5.1. Marae experiences

#### **Evacuation of whānau to Poupatate Marae**

Participants described their experiences during the first few weeks of the 2004 floods. One of the main reasons for evacuating to Poupatate Marae was the range of the facilities available:

*You can cater and you can sleep. You can manage and we're also highly skilled .. It's like most things. When you're main home... can't provide everything, what we tend to do... is go straight to the marae because we know... they're going to shower their kids there, they can cook there, and so you know you can go there.<sup>21</sup>*

*[People went to the marae] about a week or so when the water resided... [We went to the marae] because it had power, water, heating, lights... a safer environment. The water was nowhere near the marae so it was pretty safe there.<sup>22</sup>*

For some whānau, unsafe surroundings at home were more of a motivating factor to evacuate to the marae:

*The reason why we decided to evacuate the house was that the live wires were lying around the house and our mokopuna were running around. Even though there were no casualties, there were some close ones... I couldn't get down there [to the marae initially] because the [Waituna] stream was just too full raging.<sup>23</sup>*

*[Participant #8] was the first because the winds came through and blew the lines down. Some families were calling into the marae and having a kai. It became a base for food, clothes, blankets. Everything that I got from the racecourse over here, we took straight to the pā. We set it up, we notified all the families on the other side that there was kai at the pā.<sup>24</sup>*

Three whānau from the area relocated to the marae for about a month following the event. Throughout that period, other members of the community also visited and utilised the marae on a daily basis:

*[A]bout 15 people [called in] every day... There were a few [Pike] that called in for cups of tea. [The marae] was just open. Doing whatever they wanted to.<sup>25</sup>*

*[Te Rūnanga O Raukawa] called in daily... [Other community members called] collecting water, coming in from [Fielding]. We'd get about half a dozen of them coming in to fill their containers every 2 or 3 days.<sup>26</sup>*

*A lot of people were coming from town. Families from the marae were coming to the marae from town to collect water because the water in town wasn't the best... [They] grabbed containers from the marae for water purposes.<sup>27</sup>*

The marae also provided accommodation during the recovery phase, allowing whānau members to resume their normal daily lives:

*When [Participant #8] was living there, he went to work, [his partner] went to work and the kids played, life carried on... you still got to carry on. The kids could get picked up for school from there. It just became the home base instead of crossing the river.<sup>28</sup>*

*Was good [at the marae]. Could start going to work. Kids could catch the school bus from the pā. It was the ultimate place to be in that type of situation [because] the facilities are all there.<sup>29</sup>*

### **Whānau contributed resources to Poupatate Marae during the emergency**

Whānau that had a relationship with Poupatate Marae contributed food and other resources during the Flood Event:

*I think that... the marae was amply prepared anyway with the necessary cooking utensils and firewood... [We filled] a big freezer there of kai left over from various hui that is frozen and ready to go onto the next hui.<sup>30</sup>*

*We didn't even know they had food banks in town until two weeks later when my sister in law starting bringing food out to the marae... [Food] came from Feilding racecourse. We had emptied our freezers and taken [the kai] down to the pa and chucked it into the marae's freezers.<sup>31</sup>*

The experiences of other marae in the region also illustrate how Māori communities supported the relief efforts of individual marae, assisting in the provision of accommodation, food and information in the response and recovery phase.

*Not so much the marae, it's the whole community...all the ones who did have homes where they could cook, they were actually all providing food and...were shipping this food out to people...they'd been working round the clock, just doing the actual practical stuff. None of this highfalutin high level stuff – just survival stuff...they were basically helping their own and it was classic civil defence, where each person gets to help their own.<sup>32</sup>*

### **A number of other marae played central roles during the emergency event**

The experience of Poupatate Marae was not unique. Participants throughout the research referred to other marae within the Rangitikei and Manawatu regions and beyond that served as community emergency centres in many instances. They provided immediate shelter and food for evacuees and some continued to provide



accommodation for a number of weeks after the event. The role of rural marae was particularly significant in this respect and their role became vital to the emergency response.<sup>33</sup>

*In 2004 and 2006 I would say that the [marae and its people] were such an asset to the response and the recovery...I think that will happen again if we need evacuation in any emergency or disaster...they're so highly organised out there.<sup>34</sup>*

*I was out there on a weekly basis, checking to see if they needed any more food, or clothing or bedding, or if there was anything we could do to help them.<sup>35</sup>*

### **Some marae were ill-equipped to deal with evacuees in their area and required infrastructural support**

While marae are generally designed to accommodate a number of people, one external participant suggested that, due to the natural hospitality of Māori, many marae took in more people than they could cope with. As a result, some participants suggested that they may have needed more infrastructure and backup support such as tentage and emergency generators to support evacuees.

*In civil defence emergencies marae can normally look after themselves and a little bit....[they] are not good at knowing when they've done enough.<sup>36</sup>*

In other cases, marae needed support to ensure facilities were of a satisfactory standard in order to support evacuees. The regional council provided one marae with a generator and another marae was provided with a mobile generator by the district council.<sup>37</sup> This marae, acting as an impromptu community emergency centre was unfinished and needed further support from the district council:

*The marae hadn't been finished properly, they were lacking infrastructure...they hadn't finished the ablution block, so we had to help them out so that people could actually use it.<sup>38</sup>*

Other marae in the region are low-lying and susceptible to flooding, and therefore unsuitable to act as community emergency centres. Some marae were in fact flooded twice: in February and again in July 2004.

*This last [marae] has just been flooded yet again, so they put the carpet down and hello, another flood.<sup>39</sup>*

### **Poor housing conditions compounded problems with some Māori households**

Some Māori communities suffered extensive damage to housing, which was compounded by existing low socioeconomic status. Without insurance or the resources to rebuild, the impact of the event was much greater. This was ameliorated to some extent by provisions made by the district council of new bedding and whiteware.

*This was a community trying to rebuild, or keep their stake in the community, and then it was all devastated basically...from the claims that we looked at I would guess not many of them were insured.<sup>40</sup>*

*We actually made up a house pack. Some of them have got a new washer, or a new dryer, not both. Or they might have got the new fridge. We gave that marae a brand new 22 cubic foot deep freeze.*<sup>41</sup>

### **Māori communities suffered impacts on health as a result of isolation**

Isolated marae supporting evacuees, particularly those with inadequate resources, were at a greater risk of health problems. One district council was particularly concerned about the health risks affecting the evacuees at a marae where large numbers of people were sharing a confined space and had limited access to fresh water and washing facilities:

*These guys were going into houses where you've got rotten food after several days, you've got all sorts of stuff floating, you've got raw sewage, and if you can't wash properly...we were quite aware of that risk.*<sup>42</sup>

*It came very close to a couple losing their lives. Again, it would have been some people from that marae.*<sup>43</sup>

## **5.2. Relationships**

Participants discussed the importance of relationships with civil defence groups and the local authorities to contributing to effective marae preparedness and emergency management.

### **The only relationship Poupatate Marae has with a local authority is through the Marae Consultative Committee**

Participants pointed to the Marae Consultative Committee as the only example of a relationship that exists between marae and Māori communities and a local authority (in this case, the Manawatu District Council). Participants further identified shortfalls with the Committee concerning its ability to build effective relationships:

*I think it's so token that I can't be bothered [with it] because of negative experiences over the years...for example, the notion that there is no Māori representation on the Council and in my memory there hasn't been and it's a matter of us [Māori] just getting on and do what we can do despite the 'reality' of racism...*<sup>44</sup>

Participants raised concerns that the Committee represented the *only* example of any interaction by the local authority with marae and Māori communities:

*[The] only interaction is through the Marae Consultative Committee, except for notices relating to the RMA and resource consents...Other than that, there is little or no interaction.*<sup>45</sup>

This view was expressed also by external participants. It was perceived that in some areas there was little direct involvement with Māori communities. With respect to civil defence, the interaction between marae and civil defence was described as 'fairly distant' and cooperation relies on a 'tacit understanding' that contact between the two parties would be made if necessary, and the 'naturally assumed position' at the council would reimburse costs incurred.<sup>46</sup> This was based on the assumption that Māori communities work well independently and that the Marae Consultative Committee will represent marae interests at council level.

*Not much direct contact with Maori organisations, but we work through the Marae Committee – part of the Council structure. We have little day-*

*to-day contact with them. I guess that's self-explanatory insofar as they have proved that they are quite capable of doing what is required of them without any formal degree of training.*<sup>47</sup>

Another participant raised the issue of the variable levels of communication in connection with a lack of Māori representation in civil defence:

*I do have a concern though that the liaison between the local authority or civil defence emergency management and Māori communities isn't as strong in some areas as it could or should be... I think that there isn't a lot of civil defence staff that have a Māori background or understanding of things Māori ...that's why they haven't got an understanding of the cultural aspect.*<sup>48</sup>

In other areas, channels of communication appear to be fairly well-established:

*I had no problems [with communication] and we ended up with good links...I think that's in place now, because we have got a person who lives at [the Māori community] on our weekly call-up systems for CB radio.*<sup>49</sup>

Similarly, the absence of strong links between organisations can lead to ineffective use of resources and unfocussed planning:

*Some agencies did not know what others had to offer or some tasks would have been achieved much more easily with an enhanced information flow.*<sup>50</sup>

### **A lack of a Māori 'presence' within the district**

The relationship issues identified above were expressed by many participants within a context of wider issues concerning a lack of 'Māori presence' within the district. Participants expressed views that:

*If you came into [the district], you wouldn't even know there were Māori living in here... there are no Māori icons in this town. You go into the Council office and there is no indication to say that there is Māori in this community... that there are tangata whenua.*<sup>51</sup>

*The whole setup of the Council precludes Māori involvement... it's not inclusive and it's not encouraging. It's not an organisation that Māori are seen to be welcome into.*<sup>52</sup>

## **5.3. Communication**

### **Lack of communication between civil defence groups and Poupatate Marae**

Participants identified a lack of contact from civil defence groups during the initial two weeks of the event as being detrimental to their recovery effort, particularly with respect to identifying recovery options available within the region at that time:

*[We stayed at home for] a week or week and a half. No contact with the Councils or Civil Defence. We didn't even know that the Red Cross had food supplies. We were about a week staying down the marae and one of the cousins starts bringing all this food in.*<sup>53</sup>

*We had no contact with them. We just went off and did our own thing. Never thought about [having contact with them]. They didn't come and contact us. I think in that whole week, you never thought about anything except getting back out there and seeing where the needs were and where they were needing help. If we could do it, we did it. Didn't bother about getting in touch with the Civil Defence...<sup>54</sup>*

*If they had been completely cut off, then things might have been a bit tricky because there is no way of getting out. So again the communications... people had cell phones, so that wasn't a biggie... would have been a big issue if there was no way of getting out and food was getting short... [and] would have been an issue had there been illness. Kuia and koroua and mobility issues, but that didn't occur.<sup>55</sup>*

### **Māori communities experienced other detrimental impacts which were exacerbated by isolation**

Participants also discussed other detrimental impacts caused by landslips, debris and storm force winds. These were exacerbated by isolation and lack of access, which hampered relief efforts.

*I said to them, on the news we saw Rangiotu Marae sitting up just above the water. And I said to them the Army went out to help them, that's fine, but there were other areas and they were virtually cut off and our people were around there. We have Poutu marae who didn't suffer anything from the floods but the effects afterwards they did because they had all the winds straight after the flood which knocked trees over, fences out and nobody was of any help there. [Another example] the Moutua gates opened up... to let the water out... and we have other marae further on down that got affected...<sup>56</sup>*

One external participant noted that Māori communities were further isolated by a lack of publicity:

*Maori in this area were probably more seriously affected in lots of ways, but all the publicity went to Scotts Ferry, which was easily accessible by helicopters and news crews. More Pākehā population and more interesting population...Māori didn't have a face in that emergency.<sup>57</sup>*

### **Poor communication affected communities across the region**

Poor communication in general was identified as a major obstacle to the response and recovery effort.<sup>58</sup> Communication was a particular problem for isolated Māori communities who were left without landline or cell phone communication and were unable to communicate the severity of their situation to civil defence.

Marae located in remote areas without cell phone contact were isolated for extended periods. The 2004 Flood Review notes in particular that 'areas without communication...became overlooked.'<sup>59</sup> In other cases it was several days before civil defence became aware of the situation:

*The road was blocked off and there is no cell phone contact up in that valley...the only way we knew what was happening, was when someone walked out onto the main road, up to the top of the hill and rang us on their cell phone...there were no CD radios this time which made things difficult.<sup>60</sup>*

*Because communications had been so poor, we didn't know that that particular marae had that problem.*<sup>61</sup>

*[The marae] was badly affected because it's right on the banks of the river. Luckily there's another marae up the road, on higher ground, who kindly took these people in. And when we went up there we got told off, because they were forgotten.*<sup>62</sup>

### **Channels of communication between civil defence groups, marae and Maori communities were variable**

Despite widespread acknowledgement that marae form natural community emergency centres as they are very well-prepared to address the needs of large numbers of people, channels of communication are not always well-established. The level of communication between civil defence, marae and Māori communities was variable, and appeared to depend largely on the individuals' familiarity with the communities concerned and an inclination to initiate cooperative measures.

The uneven nature of communication meant that Māori communities were not always checked on as early as they could have been.

*Checking on neighbours...is fundamentally what saves lives. Māori are fairly good at that, but central administration need to go out and check on Māori ...it is incumbent on cities and boroughs to check on their neighbours.*<sup>63</sup>

## **5.4. Stress**

### **Stress was reduced by virtue of being at the marae**

Poupatate Marae provided natural processes for alleviating stresses that arose amongst whānau during the Flood Event. Participants identified this as being largely due to the familiarity with tikanga Māori and marae protocols, and marae processes which in themselves addressed stress matters:

*You know that there will be someone to talk to – that social side there to talk to people about what you're doing. I s'pose... you've got a whole lot of people... the group consciousness that can do your brainstorming about what to do. And so all that stuff is activated on the marae<sup>64</sup> for us. Its activated at the marae because we do it just naturally anyway.... That's Māori for you... I can't explain it any other way.*<sup>65</sup>

*No stress at the marae. There was a lot of stress though when the bridge first went out. It was full on. We just had to accept it... We felt we were safe. There was no dangers around the marae. Just real relaxed. Like going back to the old ways of [communal] living.*<sup>66</sup>

*We had karakia at night, which we do anyway. And kids had wider spaces to go and play. On the same grounds as what [other marae] are on but not as large a scale. [By following tikanga of the marae] everyone already knew what to do. They knew their position... no different to a tangi... everyone knows what they're good at.*<sup>67</sup>

### **Kinship ties - whanaungatanga - helped to alleviate stress**

Another important factor participants identified was simply referred to as *whanaungatanga*, the kinship ties that bind individuals and whānau to and amongst each other. In this respect, participants identified that knowing who your

whanaunga (your kin) were, and that they were around you, alleviated stress. Also, simply knowing that there was a kinship connection with others, without necessarily knowing the nature or extent of that connection appeared to alleviate stress:

*We're all whānau and we all get on with each other.* <sup>68</sup>

*We had [communal] cooking, eating, just working together as a wider family... Could be different [if] we were living with strangers... at least we knew we were all cousins... all knew each other... whanaungatanga.* <sup>69</sup>

*[T]hat section of the valley was related to the other section. But everyone visits and so suddenly its sorted out because everyone... comes in. And also the access to a [kuia] that you might not normally have seen during that week... or an aunty or an uncle that you may not have seen normally during that week... but because of the flooding... it became a part of te whānau me te hapū... and then you know those relationships, the ones that you really love... ... but that's how we tend to do it and there's no insistence that everybody does it but there's a knowing that everybody's welcome...* <sup>70</sup>

### **'Marae-style' counselling occurred that addressed aspects of stress relating to the event**

Participants were asked about any formal counselling that may have been conducted on the marae or else provided as a support service during or following the Flood Event.

They related that they had their own way of counselling that occurred amongst individuals and whānau by virtue of being on the marae. One participant shared the following:

*You get everybody together and everybody is talking about it, you're self-counselling. You actually realise that you're not the only one going through all those problems at the time. So you share your problems and you lighten your own load and you get there and sit down and start talking about things that you thought were major bad things happening to you, and you end up after half an hour having a bloody good laugh about it. Seeing the funny sides. And it's all the 'group therapy' stress relief... whanaungatanga... we [Māori] are humourous even in the worst scenario.* <sup>71</sup>

In terms of formal counselling, participants did note that no formal counselling was provided. However, participants did not raise this as an important issue:

*If I had known that counselling was available, then I would have taken it... [either] during or after the floods. But no-one asked...from what I know no-one in my valley was ever asked it and I know it affected a lot of people. But the people that we are...you can't sit around moping about it. But if I was asked, I would have done counselling."* <sup>72</sup>

*Those things [that is, counselling services] weren't offered. None of that. I mean had it have been offered, then it might have been a different story, but we know ourselves that we could do our own counselling via the 'group counselling' thing. The main thing for Māori is that each family are fine.* <sup>73</sup>

## Whānau and marae resilience

Participants' attitudes illustrate whānau and marae resilience:

*We're all pretty good at emergencies because we do it all the time. A tangi is an emergency.*<sup>74</sup>

*You already know that you're not going to be the first looked after, you're going to look after yourself anyway. There was stress amongst [us] but do you know what we do with stress when we're busy? You just get on with the job! Then you have a big tangi [cry]... but we listen out to see how they are... we make sure the kids are ok... in our own ways.*<sup>75</sup>

*We were just doing what we could do, with what we had... We did it all ourselves.*<sup>76</sup>

These views were shared by a number of external participants who commented on the practical response of Māori communities in organising themselves and providing for the community and evacuees.

*They basically just got on with it...they are brought up with it, it's just what you do. It's large scale hospitality and feeding the masses.*<sup>77</sup>

*It's just something they do. They are well versed to having large hui and large tangi and so on, getting bulk food and preparing bulk food for some duration.*<sup>78</sup>

However, one external participant did observe that the isolation also took a toll psychologically on Māori communities.

*We were checking mental health as well...they are so used to being ignored and being self-sufficient they basically just got on with it, but I think after a few days...I think it's the stress of trying to feed [everyone].*<sup>79</sup>

## 5.5. Recovery

An emerging picture from the data was that practices and processes of Māori communities and those of civil defence and emergency management groups were not necessarily congruent or complementary. Rather, the approach of Māori communities during the event often diverged markedly from the approach of civil defence and emergency management groups, albeit necessarily to ensure better provision for whānau.

### **Māori communities had a unique response to the Flood Event**

Māori communities responded to the Flood Event in a unique way, specific to their 'world view'. Whānau members of Poupatate marae assisted with the recovery effort that was facilitated by the social and health services section of Te Runanga O Raukawa. One of the whānau members described the planning and co-ordinated efforts as follows:

*On the Tuesday, the water has started to go down and being able to get back into [the Rūnanga offices] to say this is what's happening, by that time it was high mobility for everybody to find out who needed help... This was co-ordinated by [Te Rūnanga O Raukawa]. Most of us are Māori. There were four of us that are kaimahi of [the Rūnanga] who used [the Rūnanga offices] as their base. So between us we just contacted Ngāti Kauwhata who are also iwi... we made contact with them to say 'How can*

*we help?... 'Who do we need to look after?...' 'Who do we need to go and see?' So what the local iwi did was a list of names that they thought might be in that area of high need... maybe flooded out. Some of them were young families, school kids... and [asking] 'what were their needs?' ... the four of us split the list up and went in different directions...<sup>80</sup>*

*I had my area and I stuck with that area and just said to the others 'the area that we're going into, the list that split up, stick with them – if we each stick with them, we know that they're alright? If there's anything that you might need from me, then [let me know]. We had meetings every day. In the mornings, we'd sort out our own mahi and then when we were finished, we'd all come together and go over to see if our people were ok. It was good doing it that way because sometimes they would pick up from those families somebody else who was [in need]. [We met] in the [TROR] office... or at the office in Palmerston. [Meetings were attended by] just ourselves... we did our own co-ordinating. If we met here [the Feilding office] Ngāti Kauwhata was involved.'<sup>81</sup>*

The response was developed based upon tikanga Māori, the 'Māori way of doing things', and in accordance with processes inherent in the interactions of local whānau, hapū and iwi. For example, the recovery approach utilised traditional networks, commonly referred to as 'whakapapa links' to establish community contacts for emergency response and recovery:

*"[The list came from] the Māori kūmara vine and just ringing around. We said use here [the Rūnanga offices] as a base for any calls for anybody in need, we will try and get to them as soon as we can. [The list] was the whole community of Māori.'<sup>82</sup>*

### **Face-to-face approach to recovery**

Participants identified that more intensive, face-to-face approaches to recovery better suited Maori whānau and communities. This was necessary in that the research showed that Māori whānau did not actively reach out for help:

*...our Māori people won't ask for help if they're in dire straits. If they're in need, they won't ask for help... [W]e go in and say to them 'what are your needs?' and we did have 'high needs' families... they had to be evacuated and moved into other accommodation, which the Civil Defence helped with too, but it was ongoing accommodation for [some families] because they had nothing - no clothes, no bedding, no nothing.'<sup>83</sup>*

The face-to-face approach was shown particularly with the approaches adopted with kaumātua and the elderly during the emergency:

*And getting out to our old people who were in their homes. We got phones to [identify kaumātua and kuia] and asked 'have you been there?' Kaumātua and kuia and young families [were made a priority]. [Involved] going to see them 'face-to-face' because you can ring them and they'll say 'yes they're fine' even if the water is lapping around their feet... they don't like asking and most of them don't.'<sup>84</sup>*

Again, the common theme was reluctance amongst Māori whānau to actively seek assistance during the emergency event.



### **Māori communities used their own initiatives to establish relief efforts**

Other Māori communities also used their own initiatives to establish and maintain communication with civil defence and coordinate relief efforts. One external participant described the coordinated relief effort organised by one Māori community:

*They were running their own little civil defence effort...they were actually all providing food...and you know shipping this food out to people...ringing in here to find out what was going on...they tried declaring on their own account at one stage.<sup>85</sup>*

### **Māori communities perceived Civil Defence Planning as exclusive of Māori input**

A whānau member from Poupatate Marae described her involvement with the recovery group as a representative of Māori in the community:

*...even that flood recovery group which came up around two or three months later... they never made contact with us. It was just by fluke that I happened to hear about it... I was just told there was a committee and that I should jump on to... have an iwi representative on there... [The group] had already had a couple of meetings before someone had made me aware of it and said that there's been no iwi input.<sup>86</sup>*

*And so I went in and I had to explain where our marae [was]. I had to point out on a map where we were, where the flood was... where the other people were stuck on the other side of the river... and explain all that to them because they just didn't know we existed... I did it that way because they then understood what I was talking about. As soon as I started doing a map and writing up the names of the marae and [where they were] based... those that live out in the country knew.<sup>87</sup>*

### **The differing procedures and systems of marae and civil defence were highlighted, along with the need to increase awareness of both systems**

In many instances, marae and Māori communities had their own procedures, which did not necessarily operate in the same way as civil defence procedures. With respect to working alongside Māori communities, external participants, provided the following perspectives:

*I had a meeting out there with a group at the fire station about civil defence arrangements and what needs to be in place, and we had a good discussion, but the bottom line was they didn't like me coming. They said, we've got our own arrangements; it works well. We just need to know that you are there and how we can integrate and work along with you. And so that's fine.<sup>88</sup>*

*We've got all our systems at civil defence and your Māori community has got all their systems that don't necessarily fit within our local government boundaries...and it's the two systems being familiar with each other [that] is critical, that communication and understanding...I see our key role as you know, we've got our system – what do you need to help your people or community?<sup>89</sup>*

## **Emergency management plans and procedures do not acknowledge the specific role and needs of marae and Māori communities**

The written and oral data from participants made reference to the policy, planning and implementation of the civil defence and recovery procedures during the event.

There is virtually no mention of the role of the Māori community or marae during an emergency event in planning documents, at national or regional level. The 2005 National Civil Defence Emergency Plan makes reference to Māori communities only in terms of Te Puni Kokiri's role in working with local iwi and iwi providers to assess the need for welfare and provide support.<sup>90</sup> At regional level, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEMG) Plan for the Manawatu-Wanganui Region does not incorporate any provisions for establishing cooperation with marae or recognition of the particular situation of Māori settlements.<sup>91</sup> One participant suggested that this is attributable to the use of marae in emergencies as 'a relatively new concept' and acknowledges that marae have not been fully considered:

*In certain areas it makes perfect sense. They are ideally set up for lots of people...Marae, great idea, better equipped than probably any school...but probably marae just haven't been thought of.*<sup>92</sup>

The February 2004 Flood Review similarly concluded that the role of Māori communities had not been fully understood, and emphasised that 'the special nature of Māori society and settlements needs to be considered during civil emergencies.'<sup>93</sup>

### **5.6. Reimbursement**

#### **A 'Māori perspective' was shown relating to reimbursement**

The research revealed data on Māori perspectives to reimbursement. The data showed that, in general, Māori communities were reluctant to seek reimbursement for costs incurred during an emergency event.

*At that time, it was the last of our thoughts. It didn't even bother us about reimbursement, but I was told then, that people go to our marae and use the showers and everything, we would be reimbursed by... I think... Council at that time.*<sup>94</sup>

*[At] one of our meetings, we discussed [reimbursement] and our Aunty said 'no, we don't need to be reimbursed for anything... because it came from [our heart]'... the work that we did... so we didn't... we didn't apply and we didn't put in a costing.*<sup>95</sup>

Participants suggested that this approach may stem from traditional perspectives of kaumātua but that these views still influence Māori community efforts today:

*[Kaumātua view that] when you get given something, they want something back... and [with our kaumātua] they don't receive easily... you can't give them just anything, unless they know why you want it. But they'll fundraise the hell out for you... but don't you give them something... because that's the way that they are.*<sup>96</sup>

*Its really hard to receive something if you don't think you need it... no matter what you [the giver] say. 'I'll give you \$2000 for that' and we say*

*'But I don't need \$2000' [and they say] ' but you can have it anyway'.... We're not going to make the most of a situation just [because] its happening. We'll receive it because we deserve it, not because you want to give it, to appease a whakaaro [thought] there that you want to give it.<sup>97</sup>*

*And that's that pride thing too... we never ask... our aunties and uncles and kuia and koroua of that era are into that 'we don't need for anything' [approach]... we make do with what we've got.<sup>98</sup>*

Feedback from external participants suggested that marae did not always claim back costs and were not given full recognition and compensation for their efforts.

*They often go to enormous cost and effort. Recognition and compensation are a natural part of the recovery process.<sup>99</sup>*

It was perceived that the natural generosity of Māori to help those who are in need of assistance can place severe demands on the resources of the marae. To then apply for assistance from relief funds can be seen as culturally inappropriate. In such circumstances the relief fund should consider gifting a koha.<sup>100</sup>

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22 Pers. comm. #8, 16 November 2006.  
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26 Pers. comm. #8, 16 November 2006.  
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30 Pers. comm. #8, 16 November 2006.  
31 Pers. comm. #8, 16 November 2006.  
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46 Pers. comm. #1, 10 November 2006.  
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56 Pers. comm. #6, 16 November 2006.  
57 Pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
58 Flood Review Team (2004:42).  
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60 Pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
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63 Pers. comm. #3, 22 November 2006.  
64 A whare puni is another term for 'meeting house'.

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- 65 Pers. comm. #9 20 November 2006.  
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67 Pers. comm. #8, 16 November 2006.  
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70 Pers. comm. #9, 20 November 2006.  
71 Pers. comm. #10, 20 November 2006.  
72 Focus Group, 20 November 2006.  
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82 Pers comm. #6, 16 November 2006.  
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[http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/Files/National%20CDEM%20Plan%202005/\\$file/NatCDEMPanOrder\\_43191.pdf](http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/Files/National%20CDEM%20Plan%202005/$file/NatCDEMPanOrder_43191.pdf) (16 November 2006).  
91 Horizons Regional Council (2004). Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEMG) Plan for the Manawatu-Wanganui Region. <http://www.horizons.govt.nz/default.asp?pageid=44#Plan> (16 November 2006).  
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100 Flood Review Team (2004:49).

## 6. Suggestions for effective approaches

The research provided information about effective approaches that may be considered for future emergency management for Māori communities. Findings relating to proposed effective approaches have been outlined in the following sections.

### 6.1. Marae as focal point

Our findings showed that in an emergency, marae form a focal point not only for the local Māori community, but also for civil defence teams. Participants suggested a number of ways that the centrality of marae to emergency response and recovery efforts could be more fully exploited. An indication of areas where prior preparation is needed was also given.

#### **A wider, more holistic view of a 'marae' may be adopted**

Participants provided useful perspectives on what is encompassed within the concept 'marae'.

*Which part of the marae do you want to know about? Do you want to know about its uri? do you want to know about its whenua? do you want to know about its awa? do you want to know about its maunga? Do you want to know about its rākau? Do you want to know about its mokopuna? So which part of 'marae' are you talking about?<sup>101</sup>*

Perspectives such as these may have bearing on emergency management planning for marae and Māori communities. Some related perspectives were provided about 'marae' in relation to 'whānau'. Participants stressed the need to differentiate the needs of a marae in an emergency situation from the needs of 'whānau':

*They shouldn't [group] us with a marae and think that's going to appease every whānau... [because] there are marae that need [support] for marae reasons and there are whānau that need [support] for whānau reasons. Marae will be your port of call but don't think one pūtea [fund] is going to cover the whole lot...<sup>102</sup>*

#### **Civil defence teams relied, to varying extents, on marae and Māori communities during the response and recovery phase**

External participants agreed that 'the [marae and its people were] an asset to the response and the recovery'.<sup>103</sup> There was also the understanding that marae would be a significant contributor in future events:

*I would probably struggle if I had to go out and use another facility, basically to find...you need the mattresses, the blankets, all those comfort needs and that's probably why I would say the marae are the ideal facilities to set up as immediate welfare needs facilities.<sup>104</sup>*

In some areas there is recognition that marae require support to fully carry out the role of a community emergency centre, whereas in others they are assumed to be capable and left to get on with it.

*[The marae] does need a bit of funding support, infrastructure, particularly communications.<sup>105</sup>*

*They have proved that they are quite capable of doing what is required of them without any formal degree of training.<sup>106</sup>*

### **There was recognition of the suitability of many marae to serve as community emergency centres**

There was a widespread acknowledgement from external participants of the suitability of marae to function in the role of community emergency centre:

*Within the marae, they are very well prepared. They've got the kitchens, they've got the gas cookers and all that sort of thing and the community can roll up there and get some sort of succour...it's just something they do.<sup>107</sup>*

*The marae structure is a very good structure, almost designed for civil defence...they have whare suitable for housing and feeding, they have the bases of administrative structure, they work collectively...it's there and it works.<sup>108</sup>*

However, they also pointed out that it is important to be aware that not all marae are suited to serve as emergency centres. It was identified that many, for example, are susceptible to flooding themselves or do not have the size or infrastructure to deal with large numbers of people.<sup>109</sup> The necessity of promoting the availability of marae as evacuation centres to the community as a whole was also highlighted:

*You would need to be careful to think about how you would make everyone, not only aware of it, but make them feel that it is okay...a lot of people...know enough to know that there are lots of protocols and rules and you can't go just walking on there. I think it needs to be recognised that hand in hand with making them available, here's how to use it.<sup>110</sup>*

Relationships have been established with marae in the region to serve as community emergency centres in the event of future emergencies, with a view to using them to serve the whole community. It was suggested that this type of cooperation with marae could easily be replicated throughout the region. Marae acting as community emergency centres were also identified as community facilities.

*The first thing is to make approaches to the marae and see if they are keen to come on board. Talk to them and go from there...the marae are there, but they are a community facility; should something happen, it's for the communities. Yes, it is in more ways a Māori facility, but on the day it's the community who are going to go there...it would serve the community. It's not just set up for Māori. In an emergency, it's for the community.<sup>111</sup>*

*There's no parallel welfare for Māori /non-Māori. There is marae – the community emergency centre – and it serves the whole community in the area.<sup>112</sup>*

## **6.2. Relationships**

Throughout the study, participants emphasised the importance of relationship building to laying the foundations for a successful emergency response. It was suggested that where relationships had been developed prior to the event, the

response and recovery phase was more manageable. Conversely, where no consultation had taken place, cooperation was minimal. Participants suggested potential approaches that could be adopted to facilitate relationship building.

### **Relationship building is important for developing marae and Māori community preparedness**

Participants expressed views that working relationships between marae and Māori communities with local authorities would enhance the effectiveness of response efforts in the region. The recognised starting point was consultation and dialogue amongst groups which, to date, has not occurred.

*This is not working with marae and Māori communities because we haven't seen anybody. Nobody has come to consult with us on that... As chairman I haven't seen any correspondence to that effect... before or since [the 2004 floods].<sup>113</sup>*

*There should be Māori specific consultation... particularly from a point of view of a Treaty relationship. Haven't even seen a token question about what our Māori people think [about emergency management].<sup>114</sup>*

The importance of personal contact and relationship building was also emphasised by external participants as essential for improved communication:

*The other thing that is very important, is to have someone out there with the local knowledge: people that know people... Māori will talk better to someone they know.<sup>115</sup>*

### **A 'partnership' approach is required to develop relationships between local authorities and Māori communities**

Partnership approaches were identified as a framework within which relationships may develop:

*I'd like to see a partnership or Treaty approach to local government where there is representation... wherein iwi are naturally part of the decision-making role... Rūnanga and social services already have these inroads and relationships with Māori communities, so they're the best ones to do it. Those relationships are starting to develop that weren't otherwise there.<sup>116</sup>*

### **The Māori Consultative Committee was viewed as an initiative from which to develop more effective relations**

*There is a door open already, but the door appears to be one-way and so for the door to be two-way we probably need to let [the Council] know that we need to make sure that it happens in another way... We now need to wero – to challenge – that's once in a while, they come and noho [sit] on the marae.<sup>117</sup>*

*What probably needs to happen is that we karanga hui with that group and remind them... revisit this in some kind of whanaungatanga hui... that there are relationships that just weren't activated..<sup>118</sup>*

*[Need] to give [the Māori Consultative Committee] some actual teeth... some part in the decision-making, because it is only what it says it is... 'consultative'... and [the Council] don't need to listen to them.<sup>119</sup>*

### 6.3. Knowledge

Closely related to the issue of relationship building is the exchange of information. Participants highlighted gaps in the provision and exchange of information during the emergency and indicated potential opportunities to improve knowledge transfer.

#### **Māori communities require information about available resources and support**

Participants expressed views that there is an onus upon local authorities to provide information to marae and Māori communities about emergency management and local resources and procedures.

*I'm not sure how we can be helped in as much as that we're not normally helped anyway. When you say to us 'what would you like?' how would we know because we don't know what you've got to give. Really, what you have to give, is what we need... When you say 'what support do you need?' other than who we all are and what we already do... what else have you got to give us? We do have it... but they [emergency support services] don't have it.... You're probably going to interview them [Council]<sup>120</sup>*

It was also suggested that local authorities educate themselves about marae and Māori communities within their respective regions:

*[T]he Council didn't go to the social services nor the Rūnanga to access Māori communities and as a result, they missed out on pockets of [the community] because they didn't even know they were there. Had they gone straight to the Rūnanga, the Rūnanga already had those networks. So it's a matter of putting those relationships in place, specifically for CD purposes.<sup>121</sup>*

*I think that instead of us going out to these groups [Council, civil defence] as a hapū or iwi or marae committee, they need to know us... they come to us... District Council and Horizon should send people out to the meetings, when marae have their committee meetings. Then you'll see how the marae is run, you'll hear a lot, and you'll [get to] know people along the way.<sup>122</sup>*

*The Council didn't know those places [marae] were there or that people were at them. Communication during the event is something that they want to focus on. Education and information for Māori communities – need effective in-roads into Māori communities to actually educate whanau and marae on CD processes; to educate them on what they should have eg. first aid kits, an inventory of local human and physical resources, back up phone lines.<sup>123</sup>*

### 6.4. Representation

Our findings indicate a perception amongst many of the participants, both external and internal, that many of the shortfalls identified in relationship building and exchange of information could be immediately addressed through better Māori representation at decision-making levels:



## **Māori representation on decision-making groups is limited**

External participants observed that Māori representation on emergency management committees and welfare advisory groups is largely limited to Te Puni Kōkiri. There is therefore a strong reliance on Te Puni Kōkiri to represent Māori interests:

*Our initial decision-making group is our emergency management committee; the representatives from the marae are not involved in that. They don't need to be, not in the initial stages, the day-to-day discussions...I don't think there's a need for it to be honest, because...our representative for the Māori community, locally, regionally and nationally is Te Puni Kōkiri.*<sup>124</sup>

Views were also expressed that Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups should have a Māori representative, elected through consultation with local Māori. At a regional level, there were no Māori representatives on recovery groups.

*We have found, certainly at a regional level, that finding an iwi representative is hard, because who represents iwi? It can be a big issue...I'm sure an iwi representative that was coordinated could be useful, but possibly better at a district level.*<sup>125</sup>

Inadequate Māori representation in decision-making was also highlighted by the 2004 Flood Review. A recommendation was made for:

*CDEM Groups [to] take every opportunity to involve representation of marae committees on their local Welfare Advisory Groups.*<sup>126</sup>

## **Formal Māori representation within civil defence groups**

Participants identified a need for formal representation on civil defence groups of marae and Māori community members:

*We need a Māori representative on civil defence... We need someone in the Council. For us, the main question was 'who should we talk to... at the Council?' Even now I don't have a clue who is in charge. So it's getting a co-ordinator that we can identify with that actually comes out and sees us, to let us know when they were going to give us access, [information on the status of] power, phones - somebody that we could actually talk to about those things would have been really, really good.*<sup>127</sup>

*We need clear access to resources during the emergency phase. And clear communication with follow-up organisations during the recovery stage. How that happens? Need to have someone that will liaise between Māori and whatever services are put in place with the emergency.*<sup>128</sup>

Some participants saw formal Māori representation required in a wider context, within local authorities:

*Rather than have a Māori representation on recovery group, we actually need to have a Māori liaison officer within the Manawatu District Council – not a group who only meets every two months. A person for our people that go in and out of that office. ... They have a person in the regional council... but that covers the Manawatu-Wanganui, Rangitikei area, who doesn't belong to our area anyway and we don't see him.*<sup>129</sup>

In this respect, some matters for consideration were raised when discussing Māori representation:

*It's dangerous having a Māori person having a position in those organisations unless the job description is a powerful one... unless they're at management level... unless a team approach is taken with the rest of the management. Simply employing a Māori is not enough. It has to be a Māori person who has got some 'grunt' within the organisation.<sup>130</sup>*

*A Māori Liaison Manager or an Iwi Relationships Manager would be good... Would depend on that person's mana – that person's standing in the community. Some type of organisations would take the view that any Māori would do or that any Māori with RMA experience would do.<sup>131</sup>*

*Need a strong, strategically-thinking person in that role. That person would or could then make the [Māori Consultative Committee] workable.<sup>132</sup>*

## 6.5. Communication

Participants contributed a number of suggestions regarding the type of communication seen as being most successful and noted successful developments subsequent to the Flood Event which have improved communications.

### **Kanohi-ki-te-kanohi approach most suited for communication**

Kanohi-ki-te-kanohi, or face-to-face approaches were clearly identified as good practice when communicating with marae and Māori communities:

*I go with the personal approach... because we [marae] are supposed to be a civil defence post... and if [they] want to know about our marae areas, and the civil defence post, and those that did the training... then [they] need to keep a finger in there just to see how things are going, to inform us that its time to do some more training, just to upskill ourselves, and did we have anybody else [to train for emergencies]...<sup>133</sup>*

*Marae need a kanohi-ki-te-kanohi approach because that's what works with us... that's the only way to communicate with Māori. Make the contact with the marae and let them of the marae get the people that they know out of their hapu [to train].<sup>134</sup>*

### **Marae as starting points for communicating to the wider Māori community**

Participants suggested systems for utilising the marae network to facilitate increased information exchange:

*Things like the Council keeping an updated contact list for marae... could do that using the Māori Consultative Committee list... but I don't know whether they've made that connection.<sup>135</sup>*

*If we had some way of knowing [from Council] the early warning systems...[we] can take advantage of networks established by marae. That would apply for the marae... for those living around the marae... and those connected to it. It certainly would apply as another means of receiving information.<sup>136</sup>*

*Early information is useful going to individuals. Those individuals then collate [it] at the marae. Otherwise the message is going into a vacuum.<sup>137</sup>*

### **The provision to marae of radios for communication for Māori communities is important**

Improvements to communication systems have been made elsewhere in the region through the provision of radios in many locations and a system involving regular radio checks. One external participant described the system they have in place to connect civil defence with marae:

*Things have really improved since 2004...we've got a VHF radio, we've got a system throughout the district. We have radio checks on Tuesday night with...the caretaker in the school. He's got a radio in his house and he can take the radio out of there and take it down to the fire station and plug it in there...and even if the power goes off, they can just put it on a battery and have direct coms with the marae.<sup>138</sup>*

Other external participants also pointed out that the community needs to be aware of communication procedures and the necessity of practising prior to an event. For example, some communities have since been provided with radios, but there has been a level of apathy about maintaining and practising with them.<sup>139</sup> There was therefore the feeling that an awareness of the need for community preparedness should accompany improved communication systems.

*The radios that they've tried to put in there haven't been looked after and there was an unwillingness to practice with them. Not an overt unwillingness you know, it's just apathy. There is a need for the community to get together...it's in their mutual interest to have...a radio. If you're living remotely it makes sense.<sup>140</sup>*

The February 2004 Flood Review acknowledges the potential of VHF radios to improve communication, but also notes that in order to be effective radio networks require:

*.. the placement of radios at critical points in the district with the requirement that there be available operators. These radios may be better placed in secure individual homes rather than at such places as schools...where they are seldom monitored outside of working hours.<sup>141</sup>*

Another external participant recommended further that every marae should have a communications package incorporating a civil defence satellite telephone.<sup>142</sup>

## **6.6. Planning**

Participants highlighted a number of planning issues which could be addressed through harnessing the participation of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and Te Puni Kokiri to consolidate initiatives occurring at local level.

### **Communication between local civil defence groups and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management could be strengthened**

There was the perception that civil defence groups nationally are working independently on initiatives with marae and iwi that could potentially be linked to effect a wider impact.

*A lot of civil defence staff have something arranged with the local marae through the local iwi...so he's working in his community, and the Ministry is doing another project, which when you think about it, link. So there's no communication...it's the Ministry not talking to the civil defence people.<sup>143</sup>*

One external participant suggested that part of the Ministry's role could be to facilitate setting up communication and relationships, and emphasised cooperation with Te Puni Kōkiri as key:

*Try and get TPK aligned with the Ministry and to start working together. Te Puni Kōkiri represents Māori nationally...our representative for the Maori community, locally, regionally and nationally is Te Puni Kōkiri.<sup>144</sup>*

### **Mapping systems were inadequate**

A number of small communities, including some marae, could not be located on maps, impeding the relief effort. Although better mapping systems are now in place, there are still Māori homes in certain areas that are not mapped:

*Identifying the actual location of some marae was a real problem. Given that marae are frequently used as evacuation centres it would seem appropriate that the regional and territorial plans should accurately record location and also that this information should always be located in mapping systems.<sup>145</sup>*

*To understand marae and utilisation of facilities there has to be a lot of very very careful identification of where marae are located.<sup>146</sup>*

Te Puni Kōkiri have an iwi map, but it is not centrally available in the case of an event. One participant suggested that it would particularly be useful to make iwi maps available at district level.<sup>147</sup> Some district councils already have a listing and contact details for all marae in the region. This should be a recommended practice for all district and regional councils. Furthermore, the 2004 Flood Review recommends:

*a single consolidated mapping system showing all residential dwellings, infrastructure and geographical features. This system needs to be accessible to all levels of civil emergency management as a common reference database.<sup>148</sup>*

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- 101 Pers. comm. #9, 20 November 2006.  
102 Pers. comm. #9, 20 November 2006.  
103 Pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
104 Pers. comm. #2, 13 November 2006.  
105 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
106 Pers. comm. #1, 10 November 2006.  
107 Pers. comm. #1, 10 November 2006.  
108 Pers. comm. #3, 22 November 2006.  
109 Pers. comm. #3, 22 November 2006, pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
110 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
111 Pers. comm. #2, 13 November 2006.  
112 Pers. comm. #1, 10 November 2006.  
113 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006  
114 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006  
115 Pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
116 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
117 Focus Group, 20 November 2006.  
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120 Pers comm. #9, 20 November 2006.  
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123 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
124 Pers. Comm. #2, 13 November 2006.  
125 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
126 Flood Review Team (2004:49).  
127 Focus Group, 20 November 2006.  
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130 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
131 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
132 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
133 Focus Group, 20 November 2006.  
134 Pers. comm. #6, 16 November 2006.  
135 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
136 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
137 Pers. comm. #7, 15 November 2006.  
138 Pers. comm. #4, 22 November 2006.  
139 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
140 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
141 Flood Review Team (2004:42).  
142 Pers. comm. #3, 22 November 2006.  
143 Pers. comm.#2, 13 November 2006.  
144 Pers. comm.#2, 13 November 2006.  
145 Flood Review Team (2004:49).  
146 Pers. comm. #3, 22 November 2006.  
147 Pers. comm. #5, 24 November 2006.  
148 Flood Review Team (2004:66).

## 7. Conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of study participants' experiences with the 2004 Flood Event and the 'effective approaches' identified in the previous section which are intended to guide groups within the emergency management sector in future relationships with marae and Māori communities.

### 7.1. Marae

Marae were natural evacuation sites for Māori and the wider community during the Flood Event. Whānau evacuated to marae because, first, they viewed their own homes as being unsafe or uninhabitable at the time due to flood-related causes. Second, marae were the most convenient and well-equipped venues to evacuate to, with facilities for sleeping, cooking, shelter and so on. Furthermore, whānau and Māori communities were familiar with marae procedure and workings and thus a degree of stability and certainty was provided during an unsettling period.

The suitability of marae as evacuation sites was also acknowledged by civil defence groups and the wider community. It is, however, necessary to fully assess the suitability of some marae in the region to act as community emergency centres. This is particularly the case since experience shows it is likely that marae will be the initial evacuation point for not only whānau and the wider Māori community, but also the general public.

Since marae are therefore likely to be an initial evacuation site during an emergency for, at least, whānau and Māori communities, we suggest that they be incorporated meaningfully into a region's civil defence preparedness planning.

In terms of planning for marae and Māori community emergency preparedness, a wider, more holistic view of 'marae' may need to be explored with any Māori community. Assumptions ought not be made about the nature of each marae in any given district, nor its relationship and function with whānau, the Māori communities, and the wider, general community.

### 7.2. Relationships

The research showed a lack of meaningful interaction and constructive relationships between marae and Māori communities and local authorities. Many participants also perceive a lack of 'Māori presence' in the district.

A consequence of this appears to be that local authorities, including civil defence groups, lack adequate knowledge about Māori communities required for any proper emergency management planning and policy making.

Elsewhere in the region, partnerships have been established between civil defence and marae; participants suggested that these partnerships could be replicated with other councils.

To develop relationships, particularly for emergency management purposes, it is clear that meaningful and genuine consultation specifically with marae and Māori communities is required. This may involve hui held amongst marae, Māori community groups and local authorities to properly 'voice' perspectives and identify pathways forward.

The framework within which relationships may be developed was identified as a partnership framework. This suggests that a collaborative approach is needed between marae and Māori communities, and local authorities and civil defence groups. With respect to the Manawatu District, the Māori Consultative Committee provides an opening for further developing any new relationships.

### 7.3. Knowledge

Marae and Māori communities require knowledge and information about the resources and support available prior to, during and following an emergency event. This includes knowledge about the current civil defence systems that are in place and how they 'fit' within them.

Local authorities also require knowledge about systems that marae and Māori communities currently have in place – or else activate – in times of emergency. This knowledge may range from tikanga Māori and principles that will likely govern any 'Māori emergency response'; to more practical matters such as communication tools and inventories of human and physical resources available to those communities.

An exchange of information about marae locations, contact people, services available from Māori service providers will expand options available to civil defence groups to provide for not only marae and Māori communities, but the wider community as well.

### 7.4. Representation

It is clear that the preferred approach to both developing relationships and fostering knowledge exchange between and among marae, Māori communities and local authorities is to provide effective Māori representation on or within those authorities. Representation may be within local civil defence groups. Representation may be in the form of Māori staff members within a council's management structure, or it may be in the form of Māori positions at the district or regional governance level.<sup>149</sup>

Whatever form representation may take, for the purposes of emergency management for marae and Māori communities, an appropriate and suitable voice of Māori is required to inform current civil defence policy and procedure.

### 7.5. Communication

Poor communication with marae and the Māori community was a major obstacle to the response and recovery effort. Poor communication occurred because of a lack of awareness or willingness amongst the groups to actually contact or communicate effectively with each other during the event. The identified 'best practice' for communicating with marae and Māori communities is kanohi-ki-te-kanohi (face to face). This should occur specifically for and directly with marae and Māori communities. Marae would provide an obvious focal point and venue for any such direct and specific communication and dialogue, perhaps by way of a series of regular and ongoing hui.

Poor communication also occurred simply by virtue of the isolation experienced by some marae and the lack of available communication technology and resources. The research showed that marae and Māori communities need to be properly resourced to communicate effectively during an emergency event. Providing marae and Māori communities with radios could alleviate this problem.

Implementing this option would require that 'critical points' for locating radios be identified. It also requires that lines of communication between marae, Māori communities and local authorities be established, and thoroughly practised, prior to an emergency so that they can be reliably activated when an emergency occurs.

## 7.6. Stress

Evacuating to marae helped reduce stress for whānau during the emergency. One reason for this was that whānau were familiar with marae protocols and procedures, and this familiarity contributed to a sense of certainty and stability.

Being amongst whānau on the marae helped to reduce stress by simply being amongst others. This was particularly so where a kinship relationship or connection was experienced. Being cognisant of a 'kinship tie' to others during the emergency contributed to a sense of belonging and connectedness during the event which, in itself, countered feelings of isolation during an emergency. And 'marae-style' counselling occurred at the marae with people sharing their experiences, strength and hope with each other while at the marae.

These factors relating to stress during the event appear to have contributed to a degree of resiliency within whānau at the marae and within Māori communities in general.

The above suggests that marae are suitable evacuation sites to help reduce stress during an emergency, especially for whānau related to that marae. Taking this finding further suggests that action to educate and familiarise whānau, Māori communities and the wider community about protocols and traditions of any particular marae would contribute to future emergency management planning. This would include education about whanaungatanga and its role within stress management.

Further action may involve working alongside whānau and marae to identify some of the stress-relieving practices that are inherent in existing marae protocols. These stress-relieving benefits are often taken for granted as 'just how things are done'. However, by identifying some of the benefits inherent in protocols, lessons may be learnt to inform future preparedness and practices.

## 7.7. Recovery

Marae and Māori communities took the initiative to respond to the emergency on their own, in accordance with their own tikanga, practices and principles. Distinctive aspects of this approach were the use of whakapapa and familial connections to establish lines of communication and exchange information, and a more personalised, 'kanohi-ki-te-kanohi' (face-to-face) approach to interacting with whānau during the event.

The study showed that the local civil defence response occurred exclusive of any formal provision for the circumstances of marae and Māori communities: the relevant emergency management policy and plans omit any reference to marae or Māori communities. In effect, separate and distinct emergency and recovery approaches operated during the Flood Event.

Mapping key sites and resources for marae and Māori communities, particularly those used during emergencies, would benefit local civil defence planning. Identifying the main marae in the region and details relating to them would assist



in any recovery effort, especially if that marae has had previous experience with responding to an emergency.

The research strongly suggests a need for effective dialogue amongst marae, Māori communities and local authorities to share knowledge and experiences about the various approaches adopted during the Flood Event. This dialogue may include identifying the main principles underpinning various approaches, how effective each approach was, and areas of similarity or overlap. In doing so, synergies may be identified and explored to develop collaborative approaches for future events.

## 7.8. Reimbursement

The study showed that some marae and Māori communities have a reluctance to seek reimbursement for costs incurred during the emergency. This reluctance appears to exist particularly in kaumātua of the marae and relates to traditional views concerning the purposes and principles of a marae. One principle, for example, is manaaki, the basic sense of providing hospitality to all on the marae.

An exchange of knowledge is required on matters relating to reimbursement and recovery after an emergency.

On the part of local authorities, information can be shared about the principles and procedures relating to reimbursement during an emergency. This information could include an outline of costs that are eligible for reimbursement, any standard operating procedures for reimbursement, and information about other options for support.

On the part of marae and Māori communities, information can be shared about Māori perspectives and tikanga Māori regarding reimbursement. Perspectives of kaumātua can be shared, along with the practical allowances marae and Māori communities make to respect and accommodate for these perspectives. These perspectives may be considered when determining reimbursement approaches for marae, Māori communities in any future events.

## 8. Concluding remarks

An overall picture gained from this study was that during the February 2004 Flood Event, there was little, if any, constructive consultation and communication between civil defence groups and marae and Māori communities. Rather, a picture emerged of multiple response approaches, operating concurrently within the same region and effectively meeting the needs of their respective communities, but with little awareness that – or how - the other was operating and progressing. As a result, opportunities may have been lost to identify and take advantage of synergies that existed between the approaches.

It is clear that marae and Māori communities responded effectively for their communities. Their approach was also in a manner that reflected and provided for Māori values, traditions and practices. While tikanga Māori and emergency management' was not a focus of this study, it is an area requiring further research and development to properly inform emergency management planning and policy development.

A predominant theme to emerge from this study was the need to establish and effectively develop relationships between marae and Māori communities, and local authorities and civil defence groups. This is likely to advance other important aspects such as knowledge exchange, communication and planning.

The process of simply engaging in an open, honest and willing relationship can, in itself, result in positive outcomes for Māori and emergency management. First, it can provide an opportunity for groups to reflect on and contribute to the 'bigger picture' of emergency management for that region. It can provide an opportunity to identify the resources, experiences and knowledge that each group may contribute of which they may previously have been unaware. And it provides a vehicle to identify synergies for emergency management that, with ongoing dialogue, can be developed for positive outcomes in the future.

The final word for this study will be given to the whānau of Poupatate Marae. The statement below was made during the marae focus group. It encapsulates the resilient attitude that marae and Māori communities displayed throughout the event. It also provides an insightful and inspiring platform for future work in this area to develop the potential of marae and Māori communities:

*When our lives are challenged, we are our solution, not a council, not a government organisation - we are our own solution.... We have people that have the skills and at that time, they did a good job... what we had was people, and we utilise them... We need to challenge ourselves.*

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<sup>149</sup> It is noted that several options and precedents for Māori representation are available in other districts and regions within New Zealand, such as the Bay of Plenty.

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## Appendix 1



# Massey University

## INFORMATION SHEET

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### **The Role of Community Participation in Post Earthquake Recovery: lessons from recent earthquakes & floods**

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This research project is being conducted by James Hudson, a Research Officer at the Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development, Massey University. The project involves examining the role(s) of a marae and Māori community in the Manawatu involved with February 2004 flood event and the various approaches they adopted during the event.

The project includes a review of civil emergency and recovery literature, face-to-face interviews with marae and Maori community members, local authorities and other stakeholders and focus groups with Maori community members involved with the floods.

The data obtained from the project will be included as part of a wider, collaborative study seeking to examine the need for multi-organisational and multidisciplinary inputs into the decision-making and recovery process within New Zealand communities.

You are under no obligation to participate in this project. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:

- decline to answer any particular question;
- withdraw from the study (specify timeframe);
- ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;
- provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give permission to the researcher;
- be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.
- ask for the audio/video tape to be turned off at any time during the interview.

If you have any concerns in regards to this research, please feel free to contact James at the CIGAD, Private Bag 11 222, Palmerston North or telephone (06)356 9099 ext 2514 or by e-mail at [J.T.Hudson@massey.ac.nz](mailto:J.T.Hudson@massey.ac.nz).

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This project has been evaluated by peer review and judged to be low risk. Consequently, it has not been reviewed by one of the University's Human Ethics Committees. The researcher(s) named above are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research that you wish to raise with someone other than the researcher(s), please contact Professor Sylvia Rumball, Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor (Ethics & Equity), telephone 06 350 5249, e-mail [humanethicssouthb@massey.ac.nz](mailto:humanethicssouthb@massey.ac.nz)".

If physical injury results from your participation in this study, you should visit a treatment provider to make a claim to ACC as soon as possible. ACC cover and entitlements are not automatic and your claim will be assessed by ACC in accordance with the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. If your claim is accepted, ACC must inform you of your entitlements, and must help you access those entitlements. Entitlements may include, but not be limited to, treatment costs, travel costs for rehabilitation, loss of earnings, and/or lump sum for permanent impairment. Compensation for mental trauma may also be included, but only if this is incurred as a result of physical injury. If your ACC claim is not accepted you should immediately contact the researcher. The researcher will initiate processes to ensure you receive compensation equivalent to that to which you would have been entitled had ACC accepted your claim.



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