Opinion: The uncomfortable discussions New Zealanders need to start having about defence

As Aotearoa moves towards closer defence integration with Australia, New Zealanders need to more clearly understand official Australian views on defence, alongside our own.

The recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Defence Conference 2026 provided an opportunity to distil key messages. The conference was titled ‘Securing the Region for Uncertainty’. The ambiguity in the title – are we securing ourselves to prepare for uncertainty? Are we ensuring that uncertainty stays prevalent? – was initially matched by discussions that raised a degree of cognitive dissonance. But three key messages eventually emerged from officials in the room that New Zealanders need to know about: First, China is an adversary. Second, deterrence is back. Third, this is an era of whole-of-society defence.

The opening gambit from Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles, outlined how Australia is seeking to invest in both ‘exquisite’ large defence platforms and low-cost options, as well as seeking both increased agency and increased interconnectedness. In this latter case, the numerous references over the course of the day to Australia deepening its agency must be, without speaking directly about the elephant in the room, related to the cavalier actions of President Trump’s administration as well as the call for increased burden sharing by allies. The aim for Australia in such times, as the following speaker, Deputy Secretary Strategy, Policy and Industry Hugh Jeffrey suggested, is that partnerships and relationships must therefore increase options for action: providing “sovereignty with good choices”. Hence where it is both ‘feasible and advisable’, Australia is seeking to build shared capabilities with its partners to navigate an era that many see as being best understood as a form of ‘interregnum’.

Much of the discussions also centred on deterrence. However, as Professor Peter Dean asserted, the concept of deterrence is also “not fully formed”. Deterrence can be about both general deterrence and cumulative and collective deterrence, as well as ‘punishment deterrence’ and it “ultimately succeeds or fails in the mind of the adversary”. Here an American voiced chimed in. Markus Garlauskas, Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, cut to the chase:

“What concerns me is that the word China would have been mentioned a thousand times in Washington by now… it is difficult to achieve credible deterrence from a threat you are deterred from naming.”

From this point on, the language hardened, with several speakers expressly referring to China as an ‘adversary’.

Finally, the conversation moved on from focusing on military deterrence as it was acknowledged that military capability is only ‘a’ role: ‘the’ role for deterrence is whole-of-government and whole-of-nation, one that requires a broad alignment of understanding and action between public and government. This is where we pause to ask what this means for us.

For a New Zealander in the audience, hearing China clearly described as an adversary was a highly uncomfortable move, as was the consistent reference to deterrence, particularly given its past association with nuclear deterrence. And, lastly, the emphasis on the need to look beyond military deterrence to whole-of-government and whole-of-society national defence thinking also moved the conversation into unfamiliar territory.

Whether or not New Zealand ultimately reaches the same conclusions as Australia, we need to understand the thinking that is increasingly shaping the strategic outlook of our closest defence partner. Australia is already having these conversations publicly and increasingly framing defence in broader national terms. New Zealand cannot assume these debates will remain offshore. We don’t typically talk about defence and security very well here in Aotearoa New Zealand, if at all, but we need to. How should we understand China’s role in New Zealand’s security environment? What do we think of the concept of deterrence and how it is driving decisions around major investments like AUKUS for Australia? How do we understand defence and security in a broader public space? What are our concerns and priorities?

We need an ongoing national security conversation that goes beyond the echo chamber of Wellington and that steps outside a sole consideration of the role of the New Zealand Defence Force. To have this conversation properly, we first need to ensure that a broad range of voices engage, and are heard.

In support of that conversation, the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa Massey University is beginning work on a project to raise awareness and broaden public engagement with national defence and security issues. This work aims to help create the informed public discussion these issues increasingly demand, and in 2027 we will be reaching out to groups of people who may not normally be engaged in such conversations – watch this space.

Dr Bethan Greener is Professor of International Relations. She is also currently Head of School for People, Environment and Planning at Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa Massey University. Dr Greener has published extensively on international security-related topics, including New Zealand defence issues.

This article was first published on The Post on 2 July.